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What's Good for General Motors:
Corporate Speech and the Theory of
Free Expression
Martin H. Redish*
Howard M. Wasserman**
Introduction
When Charles Wilson, president of General Motors and President Eisenhower's nominee to be Secretary of Defense, in 1953 boldly asserted that
"what was good for our country was good for General Motors, and vice
versa,"' he was subjected to intense ridicule and criticism in certain political
and intellectual circles for simplistically and greedily equating his company's
own private economic concerns with those of the national interest. To be
sure, Wilson was espousing a controversial-albeit venerable-political and
economic theory that draws no distinction between the interests of the private and public spheres.2 On at least one level, however, Wilson was recognizing an indisputable fact of modern political life: whatever the government
does will inescapably have an immeasurable impact on the health and welfare
of the private corporate world and vice versa.
Some will no doubt reject Wilson's suggestion that the intersection will
always be one of positive correlation; they may well believe, instead, that
what benefits large corporate interests actually often will harm the public
interest.3 But no one realistically could deny the inevitable existence of the
intersection, for good or ill. As Professor Charles Lindblom has correctly
noted, the government and business share "the major leadership roles in the
'4
politic[o]-economic order."
The indisputability of the intersection between governmental and corporate interests renders puzzling the views of numerous scholars that the expression of profitmaking corporations is either completely undeserving of
First Amendment protection5 or entitled to only a limited or reduced level of
*

Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern University

School of Law. This Article provided the basis for Professor Redish's speech as the RandallPark Colloquium Speaker at the University of Kentucky College of Law.
** Associate, Holleb & Coff, Chicago, Ill., B.S. 1990; J.D. 1997, Northwestern University.
1 Wilson made this statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee during his
confirmation hearing to the position of Secretary of Defense. See Excerpts from Two Wilson
Hearings Before Senate Committee on Defense Appointments, N.Y. TnAms, Jan. 24, 1953, at 8.
2 Cf HERBERT HoVENKAMP, ENTERisE ND AAMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at 3 (1991)

("Classical political economy purported to develop rules for evaluating a legal regime's justice or
fairness without regard to how its wealth happened to be distributed. As a political and legal

doctrine, classicism identified the best regime as the one that maximized total wealth.")
3 See infra notes 106-109 and accompanying text.
4 CHARLEs E. LwDBLOM, PoLmcs AN MARMETs 179 (1977).
5 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate PoliticalExpenditures
andRedish's The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 646, 652 (1982) (asserting that corpoJanuary 1998
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free speech protection, 6 even on subjects of central concern to the governing
process. 7 Who, one reasonably could ask, has a greater interest in what actions the government takes with regard to the economy than corporations,
whose very survival may well turn on the success or failure of those actions?
Who possesses more firsthand knowledge and expertise on issues relevant to
potential governmental regulation of private economic activity? To exclude
corporate expression from the scope of the free speech clause, then, would be
unwisely to shut out from public debate a substantial amount of relevant,
provocative, and potentially vital information and opinion on issues of fundamental importance to the polity.
Purporting to recognize the existence of the political-economic intersection, the Supreme Court in First National Bank v. Bellotti8 held that otherwise protected expression did not lose its protected status because its source
was a corporation.9 Although the Court subsequently reaffirmed'0 and applied 1 this holding and has never actually overruled Bellotti, in later decisions the Court has implicitly but clearly pulled back from this stance.' 2 In so
doing, the Court appears to have either ignored or at least partially abandoned the principles it had wisely recognized in Bellotti.
Those scholars who oppose protection of corporate speech have suggested superficially persuasive rationales for their position. They have argued that, unlike individuals, corporations are incapable of truly exercising
liberty or obtaining the benefits of personal self-realization, factors that they
deem to be the sine qua non of free expression. Instead, the argument proceeds, corporations are nothing more than mindless, faceless entities, robotically driven by the need for profit maximization. Their expression is
therefore undeserving of First Amendment protection.' 3 Moreover, opporate speech is undeserving of protection because it "does not derive from the values or political
commitments of any individuals"); see also infra notes 126-130 and accompanying text.
6 See Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders' Rights Under the First
Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 294-95 (1981); Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr., The ConstitutionalRights
of Corporations Revisited: Social and Political Expression and the CorporationAfter First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEo. L. 1347, 1382-83 (1979); David Shelledy, Autonomy, Debate,
and CorporateSpeech, 18 HAsTiNGs CoNsT. L.Q. 541, 576-77, 584 (1991).
7 See infra notes 126-149, 196-196 and accompanying text.
8 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
9 See id. at 777; infra notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
10 See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (plurality
opinion) ("Corporations ...contribute to the discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas that the First Amendment seeks to foster." (internal quotation marks

omitted)).
11 See, e.g, id. at 8-9 (holding that a corporate newsletter receives the full protection of the
First Amendment); infra notes 43-43 and accompanying text. In the context of commercial
speech protection, it should be noted, the Court routinely has extended First Amendment protection to corporations without any discussion of the point. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 430-31 (1993); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 657-60 (1980). Traditionally, however, such protection has been at
a somewhat reduced level. See Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 422; CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at

563.
12 See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657-60 (1990); infra notes
50-77 and accompanying text.
13 See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 219 (1989) (assert-
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nents argue, protecting corporate speech improperly and artificially alters the
proper balance of expressive power in society and would threaten to "drown
out" all possibly competing expression. 14 Finally, scholars have noted that
protecting corporate speech could effectively force dissenting shareholders to
associate themselves with the corporation's expression, a harm to the share15
holders' own free speech interests that should be avoided.
None of these assertions justifies such an exclusion or even a reduction
in the reach of constitutional protection. 16 Moreover, commentators who oppose constitutional protection for corporate speech have incorrectly ignored
the numerous ways in which such expression actually fulfills the values served
by the constitutional guarantee of free speech. 17 Viewing corporations as
nothing more than faceless, robotic profit maximizers unduly truncates the
proper perspective on the nature and status of corporations because it ignores both the beneficial social purposes that legal recognition of the corporate form was initially designed to serve and the reasons that individuals
choose to take advantage of the corporate form in the first place. 18 Viewed
from this more complete social and economic perspective, the corporate form
performs an important democratic function in facilitating the personal selfrealization of the individuals who have made the voluntary choice to make
use of it.' 9 One should view corporate speech, then, as a form of indirect or
catalytic self-realization, no less valuable than the more obvious and direct
modes of self-development, and thus fully consistent with the purposes
served by the constitutional protection of speech.20
Even if the concept of catalytic self-realization were rejected, however, it
would not follow that corporate speech should be excluded from the scope of
the First Amendment. Regardless of the expression's source, such speech
undoubtedly has the effect of aiding the self-realization of the recipients of
that expression, an obvious fact often mystifyingly ignored by commentators
21
who wrongly reject constitutional protection for corporate speech.
In addition to furthering these positive values of free expression, protection of corporate speech precludes the serious negative results that traditionally flow from a failure to guarantee the freedom of speech. Regardless of
the speaker's motive for the expression, corporate speech may serve a vital
role in checking potential governmental excesses. 22 Although this role traditionally is thought to be performed by the institutional press, it is widely recing that corporate political speech is unprotected because the "speech cannot be attributed to
the choice of a free agent"); Randall P. Bezanson, InstitutionalSpeech, 80 IowA L. Rav. 735, 739

(1995) (defining corporate speech as "institutional speech," undeserving of First Amendment.
protection because it lacks a speaker); infra notes 126-130, 170-172 and accompanying text.
14 See, e.g., MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 179-84 (1986);
OWEN Fiss, LBERALISM DVIDED 15-16 (1996); infra notes 340-354 and accompanying text.
15 See Brudney, supra note 6, at 268.

16
17
18
19

See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes
20 See infra notes
21 See infra notes
22 See infra notes

231-354 and accompanying text.
83-230 and accompanying text.
131-149 and accompanying text.
149-151 and accompanying text.
126-151 and accompanying text.
151-179 and accompanying text.
193-196 and accompanying text.
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ognized today that the press, at least on occasion, has failed to perform that
function effectively. 23 Thus, it is important to recognize that alternative institutions in the private sector may have sufficient built-in incentives to perform
the governmental checking function in ways that the institutional press will
not or cannot perform.24

Finally, it is important to recognize the ideological biases that almost
inevitably underlie the exclusion of corporate speech from the First Amendment's reach. It is not difficult to predict that the speech of profitmaking
corporations will widely espouse views consistent with a capitalistic economic
and political philosophy. The decision to exclude corporate speech from the
First Amendment's scope, then, can hardly be made behind a viewpoint-neutral "veil of ignorance," 25 generally deemed a prerequisite for the government's regulation of expression. 26 It therefore requires only minimal
extrapolation to view such exclusion as an indirect but nonetheless invidious
form of viewpoint regulation-a result widely considered an egregious violation of fundamental First Amendment principles. 27

The first Part of this Article briefly describes the doctrinal development
of the current Supreme Court position on corporate speech. It will demonstrate that, although the doctrinal messages sent by the Court undoubtedly
have been mixed, the modern trend appears unmistakably away from extending full-fledged constitutional protection to corporate speech. In the second Part, the Article makes the theoretical case for the constitutional
protection of corporate speech from both the positive and negative perspectives of First Amendment theory. The final Part will respond to the theories
that support the total exclusion of corporate speech from the scope of the
constitutional guarantee. It will conclude that none of these theories in any
way justifies such exclusion.
I.

CorporateSpeech in the Supreme Court

Over the years, the Court implicitly recognized corporate speech rights
in numerous decisions that struck down generally applicable free speech restrictions when applied to an incorporated entity.28 No law had singled out
23 See infra notes 199-204 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 205-196 and accompanying text.

25 The concept is drawn, by analogy, from JoliN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42
(1971).
26 See Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression and the Civic Republican Revival in Constitutional Theory: The Ominous Implications, 79 CAL. L. Rlv. 267, 279-80

(1991).
27 See infra notes 355-370 and accompanying text. It should be noted that although this
critique may well be appropriate when applied to academic attacks on corporate speech's protection, it would be difficult to suggest that many of the current members of the Supreme Court are
guilty of ulterior, left-wing ideological motivations for their hesitancy to extend full protection to
corporate speech. In light of this fact, the inescapable conclusion we reach is that the Court's
approach is wholly defenseless, even on ulterior ideological motivations, and can therefore be
attributed simply to an insensitivity to important free speech values. See infra notes 210-230 and

accompanying text.
28 See, e.g., Linmark Assocs. v. Wllingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977) (striking down a restriction on posting "For Sale" signs); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)
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corporate speech for special burdens or restrictions, so the Court had not
been required to determine expressly whether corporate free speech rights
differed in any way from those of the individual. The fact that the Court was
willing to extend First Amendment protection even though corporate entities
were asserting the right, however, would seem to indicate the Court's implicit
assumption that corporations fell within the scope of the free speech clause.
In 1978, the Court faced this issue directly, concluding unequivocally
that the First Amendment speech right protected corporations.2 9 As the following discussion will demonstrate, however, later decisions have left the current doctrinal status of that protection largely in a state of confusion.
A.

Speech Protective Decisions
1.

First National Bank v. Bellotti3°

In Bellotti, the first case considering a statute that directly targeted corporate speech for restriction, the Court struck down a state law that prohibited corporations from making expenditures to influence issue elections other
than those "materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the
corporation. '31 The Court expressly rejected the idea that speech otherwise
protected by the First Amendment lost that protection because of the
32
speaker's corporate identity.
Three corporations and two banks had challenged the law, seeking to
speak in opposition to a referendum on a state constitutional amendment
that would have created a graduated individual income tax. 33 The Court, in a
5-4 decision authored by Justice Powell, noted the uncontested point that the
material in question would be immune from state regulation if issued by a
noncorporate source and held that "[t]he inherent worth of the speech in
terms of its capacity for informing the public d[id] not depend upon the iden'34
tity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.
This was especially true of the political speech at issue that was deemed "in'35
dispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy.
The Court focused on the role of speech in "affording the public access
to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas," as
well as the First Amendment's role in "prohibit[ing] government from limit(striking down a state law requiring newspapers to print replies to editorials); New York Tunes
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (striking down an injunction against
newspaper publication of government documents); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of
the Univ., 360 U.S. 684, 688-90 (1959) (finding unconstitutional the denial of a permit to show a
nonobscene movie); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 240, 251 (1936) (striking
down a state law requiring a license tax on all publishers, including corporations, that had publications with circulations over 20,000).
29 See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777, 784 (1978); infra Part I.A.1.
30 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
31 Id at 768. The statute also provided that no question submitted to voters dealing with

taxation could materially affect the corporation. See id.
32 See id at 778, 784.
33 See id at 769.
34 Id at 777.
35

Id
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ing the stock of information from which members of the public may draw. 36
The Court was especially wary in a case, such as the one before it, in which
the law "suggest[ed] an attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people." 37
The decision rejected several asserted justifications for the law. First,
the state did not persuade the Court that powerful corporate speech "may
drown out other points of view," at least in the absence of some showing that
corporate voices had been overwhelming or even significant in influencing
state referenda or in causing a loss of citizen confidence in the electoral process. 38 Second, the Court reaffirmed that "the concept that government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment. ' 39 Third,
the Court rejected the state's asserted interest in protecting dissenting shareholders from having their investments used to fund speech with which they
did not agree. 40 The Court found that the statute did not truly serve that
interest because it left the corporation free to speak using shareholder funds
41
in other, nonreferendum contexts.
2.

Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission 42

In Pacific Gas, the Court reversed an order of the state Public Utilities
Commission that required a utility company to permit Toward Utility Rate
Normalization ("TURN"), a citizen's advocacy organization opposing the
company on rate issues, to use the "extra space" in the company's billing
envelopes to solicit funds and distribute a newsletter advocating its position
on rate issues.43 TURN would have been able to use the envelope space four
times a year, and the utility company could respond to TURN's position in its
own newsletter. 44
Justice Powell, writing for the plurality, adhered to the principles established in Bellotti, noting the public interest in receiving information and the
irrelevance of the speaker to the question of constitutional protection.45 The
"critical considerations," wrote Justice Powell, "were that the State sought to
abridge speech that the First Amendment is designed to protect, and that
such prohibitions limited the range of information and ideas to which the
public is exposed." 4 6 The Court focused on two problems it found in the law.
Id. at 783.
Id. at 785; see also id. at 784 (noting that it is impermissible to prohibit speech based on
the identity of the speaker's interests).
38 See id. at 789-90. The Court also rejected the state's paternalistic belief that it had to
suppress advocacy that might persuade the voters. See id. at 791-92 & n.31.
39 Id. at 791 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam)) (internal
36
37

quotation marks omitted).
40 See id. at 792-93.
41 See id. at 793.
42 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality opinion).
43 See id. at 5-6. The utility company had long distributed its own monthly newsletter
called "Progress" with its monthly statements. See id- at 5.
44 See id. at 6.
45 See id. at 8.
46 Id.
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First, the law discriminated on the basis of the selected speaker's viewpoint; 47
access to the envelope space was available only to a group like TURN, which
held positions in opposition to the utility company and disagreed with the
company's views as expressed in Progress. 48 Second, the commission's order
gave rise to a problem of forced speech because the company was required to
associate with and disseminate a message with which it likely disagreed by
49
having to include the message in envelopes with its return address.
B.

Nonprotective Decisions
50
FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.

1.

In FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life ("MCFL"), the Court, in an
opinion written by Justice Brennan who dissented in Bellotti, held a federal
law prohibiting expressive corporate expenditures "in connection with" any
51
federal election unconstitutional as applied to a not-for-profit corporation.
The law prohibited corporations from using treasury funds in connection with
a federal election, requiring instead that such expenditures be made from a
separate segregated fund.5 2 The case revolved around MCFL's irregular publication of a newsletter and its one-time publication of a "Special Edition,"
which was a voting guide that showed the records of all primary election
candidates on pro-life issues. 5 3 The facts of the case raised several issues.
Justice Brennan noted that although the law "is not an absolute restriction on speech, it is a substantial one," 54 placing a more stringent restriction
on MCFL because it is incorporated, 55 and its "practical effect may be to
discourage protected speech. '56 Such a restriction might have been permissible to control the "corrosive influence of concentrated corporate wealth"
that gives corporations advantages and interferes with the marketplace of
political ideas, he reasoned.5 7 Because MCFL was not a traditional
profitmaking enterprise organized for economic gain, however, MCFL did
not pose the same danger of corruption.5 8 The resources it had amassed were
the product of its popularity in the political marketplace, not its success in the
47

See id. at 12.

48 See id. at 13.

49 See id. at 18. The Court relied on this point in Miami HeraldPublishingCo. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241 (1974), in which the Court struck down a state law granting a right-of-reply to
newspaper editorials. See id. at 258. The Court emphasized that First Amendment concerns,
such as protection from forced speech, applied to all corporations, not only the institutional
press. See id.
50 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
51 See id. at 241. MCFL was incorporated as a nonprofit, nonstock corporation to perform
educational, political, and other activities to "foster respect for human life and to defend the
right to life of all human beings, born and unborn." Id. (citation omitted).
52 See id.
53 See id. at 243-44.
54 Ld. at 252.

55 See id at 254.
56 Id. at 255; see also id. at 254 (noting the disincentive for organizations to engage in
political speech).

57 See id. at 257-58.
58 See id. at 259.
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economic marketplace.5 9 Thus, the speech prohibition was unconstitutional
as applied to MCFL. 60 The First Amendment, the Court concluded, fully
protected the expression of corporations, such as MCFL, that were "more
'61
akin to voluntary political organizations than business firms."
The Court pointed to three features of MCFL that brought its expression within the First Amendment's scope. First, MCFL was formed for the
express purpose of promoting political ideas. Second, no shareholders were
affected. Third, and finally, MCFL was not established by a business corporation and was not otherwise connected with business corporations. 62
63
2. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce

The Michigan Chamber of Commerce (the "Chamber") was a nonprofit
corporation of 8000 members, many of them for-profit corporations, whose
purpose was to (1) promote economic conditions favorable to private enterprises, (2) disseminate information and educate its members about laws of
interest to the business community, and (3) publicize to the government the
views of the business community on public policy matters. 64 The Chamber
had sought to place an advertisement supporting one candidate in a local
newspaper, reading in part: "Michigan Needs Richard Bandstra to Help Us
be Job Competitive Again. ' 65 In Austin, unlike MCFL, the Supreme Court
upheld a state law, modeled on the federal law challenged in MCFL, prohibiting corporate expenditures "in support of, or in opposition to, any candidate in elections for state office" except when the expenditure was made
66
through a segregated fund.
Justice Marshall, writing for a six-Justice majority, acknowledged that
use of funds to place advertisements urging support of a political candidate is
protected speech. 67 Further, according to Justice Marshall, the fact that the
Chamber is a corporation did not remove the speech "from the ambit of the
First Amendment.16 8 The Court adhered to its prior decision in MCFL, recognizing that the law burdened expressive activity, thus requiring a compelling interest to support it.69
The Court then held that the restriction on corporate speech was aimed
at "a different type of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated
with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to
the public's support for the corporation's political ideas. '70 Corporations
59 See id.

60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

See id. at 241.
Id. at 263.
See id. at 263-64.
494 U.S. 652 (1990).
See id. at 656.
See id. at 714 (appendix to opinion of Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See id. at 654-55.
See id. at 657.

68 Id.

69 See id. at 658.
70 Id. at 660; see also id. at 666 (describing the state's interest in "eliminating from the
political process the corrosive effect of political 'war chests"').
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were found to possess certain state-awarded advantages, such as limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets to enable them to maximize shareholders' returns. 71 Speech
by a business corporation, given its perceived power and persuasiveness, thus
was to be deemed per se a form of corruption that the state could constitutionally regulate. 72

Justice Marshall rejected the suggestion that the law impermissibly
equalized voices by restricting corporate speech; rather, the law's purpose
and effect were to ensure that corporate expenditures "reflect actual public
support for the political ideas espoused by corporations." 73 Moreover, the
state did not need to show a problem of corporate dominance; the "potential" for distorting the political process was enough to justify restricting the
speech of one powerful voice. 74
The Court proceeded to hold that, although the Chamber was a nonprofit ideological corporation, the law was constitutionally applicable because it did not share the three key characteristics that had exempted
MCFL.75 The distinction primarily revolved around the Chamber's links to
business because many of its members were either business corporations or
involved in business and because its activities related not only to political
issues but also to economic, civic, and business conditions and practices. 76
Additionally, there would be an economic disincentive for members to disassociate from the Chamber if they disagreed with any of -the Chamber's polit77
ical positions.
C. Summary
Although the Supreme Court's speech protective decisions remain good
law, subsequent trends clearly reflect the Court's hesitancy to protect
profitmaking corporate speech, at least in certain contexts. As subsequent
analysis will demonstrate, however, the Court's speech protective decisions
more accurately reflect appropriate precepts of First Amendment theory.
II.
A.

The Case for CorporateSpeech

Introduction: The Positive-Negative Dichotomy

Although the theoretical arguments supporting full First Amendment
protection for corporate speech are many, they may be grouped under two
broad conceptual headings: appeals to (1) positive free speech theories and
(2) negative free speech theories. Positive theories focus upon the affirmative benefits to which free speech gives rise, both to the individual and to
society. Negative theories, on the other hand, derive from the skeptical, mistrustful strain underlying American democratic theory, manifested more gen71

See id. at 658-59.

72 See id at 660.
73 Id.
74 See id. at 661.
75 See id at 662.
76 See id. at 662-63.

77 See id at 663.
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erally in the theory of separation of powers. 78 They recognize the inherently

vulnerable nature of a democratic system in general and of the commitment
to free expression in particular. 79 Negative theories, then, focus upon both

the hostile forces in society that constantly threaten free speech protection
80

and the harms that would ensue from the undermining of such protection.
The two categories, it should be emphasized, are by no means mutually
exclusive. Indeed, contrary to the implicit assumptions of certain commenta-

tors,81 the two concepts actually function in a symbiotic relationship: negative
theories act as a bodyguard for the positive theories. In other words, the

purpose of the negative theories is to assure that the positive benefits fostered by the commitment to free expression can be attained, free from under82
mining by hostile external forces.

B.

Corporate Speech and the Positive Theory of the FirstAmendment

Any discussion of the scope of First Amendment protection should focus, at least in part, "on the positive role of the free speech guarantee as a

catalyst in tapping and developing the uniquely human creative and intellectual capacities of the individual.

negative, 84

'83

Although the free speech guarantee is

phrased as a
it has long been recognized that the societal commitment to a system of free expression serves a variety of positive purposes.8 5
Positive theories are premised on the notion that speech enriches and enhances the lives and abilities of individuals-both speakers and listeners-as
well as the democratic society as a whole.
1. Explaining Positive Free Speech Theory: The FirstAmendment as a
Vehicle of Individual Self-Realization

As one of us has previously argued in detail, the fundamental, positive
value of the constitutional free speech guarantee is furtherance of individual
self-realization, a broad value that includes (1) the individual's development
78 See Rebecca L. Brown, SeparatedPowers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1513,

1515-16 (1991).
79 See generally Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in FirstAmendment Theory, 1977 AM.

B. FOUND. RES. J. 521 (emphasizing the value of free speech in checking abuse of power in a
democratic society).
80 See id. at 538-43.
81 See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85

COLUM. L. REv. 449, 449-50 (1985) (positing a "pathological perspective" to adjudicating First
Amendment disputes that protects the integrity of "core" speech from societal intolerance).
82 See generally Martin H. Redish, The Role of Pathology in FirstAmendment Theory: A

Skeptical Examination, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 618, 621, 627 (1988) (rejecting Blasi's pathological perspective and explaining that the decision whether to protect speech is related to the
values served by free speech).
83 Id. at 627.
84 The First Amendment provides in relevant part: "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech ....
" U.S. CONsT. amend. I, cl.
1.
85 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 13, at 3 (focusing on the liberty value that free speech

protection fosters); THOMAS I. EMERSON,

TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FmsT AMEND3 (1963) (recognizing a combination of four values that free speech fosters); Alexander
Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245,263 (recognizing how
free speech benefits the democratic process).
mENr

19981
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of her personal powers and abilities and (2) the individual's ability and opportunity to make all levels of life-affecting decisions, thereby controlling and
determining her life's course.86 The value of free speech is simultaneously
intrinsic and instrumental. It is intrinsic in the sense that "the very exercise
of one's freedom to speak, write, create, appreciate, or learn represents a use,
and therefore a development, of an individual's uniquely human faculties." 87
It is instrumental in that the receipt of a broad range of information and
opinion facilitates the making of life-affecting decisions.8 8 This dual nature of
self-realization means speech or advocacy functions both as an end in itself
and as a means to an end.
It is true that the theory of individual self-realization has achieved far
from universal acceptance as the definitive rationale for free speech protection. 89 Several theorists instead have focused primarily or exclusively upon
more communitarian-based notions, such as society's performance of the
democratic governing function.90 For purposes of the present analysis, however, acceptance of such a communitarian theory actually would make the
affirmative case for corporate speech protection even stronger.91 But more
important, the mistake of these theorists is their failure to ask the fundamental question: Why a democratic system in the first place? Our society chooses
to function as a democracy for the very reason that we value individual autonomy and self-realization.92 Otherwise, democracy could not be morally
justified. Society, after all, is made up of individuals, and if one places no
value on a single individual's exercise of autonomy, it is impossible to justify
placing a value on the collective exercise of autonomy. 93 Thus, in this sense a
communitarian approach is not necessarily inconsistent with the more individualized self-realization model because the government itself is ultimately
premised on a belief in the individual's worth.94 Both concepts dictate a com86 See MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF ExPREssION: A CRrrcAL ANALYsis 9-52 (1984).
87 Id.at 21.
88 See id.at 22.
89 For criticism of the self-realization theory, see Robert H. Bork, NeutralPrinciples and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IN'D. L.J 1, 25 (1971) (noting that the benefits of selfrealization do not distinguish speech from other freedoms); Frederick Schauer, Codifying the
First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 285, 312 (highlighting the lack of
predictability in using the self-realization principle to foster free speech protection).
90 See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (Oxford Univ. Press 1965)

(1960) (asserting that freedom of speech originated from self-government); Bork, supra note 89,
at 26 (stating that speech functions to deal with politics and government).
91 One of the key arguments used against corporate speech protection is that corporations
are incapable of personal self-realization. Under a communitarian model, however, even if true,
this factor would be irrelevant because corporate speech is consistent with the democratic political process. See infra notes 113-113 and accompanying text.
92 See, e.g., C. B. MACPHERsON, THm LwFE AND Tnvms OF LmEa.A DEMOCRACy 51 (1977)
("Democracy would.., make people more active, more energetic ....); Jack L. Walker, A
Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy, 60 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 285, 288 (1966) ("The most
distinctive feature, and the principal orienting value, of classical democratic theory was its emphasis on individual participation in the development of public policy ....[A]bove all else they
were concerned with human development, the opportunities which existed in political activity to

realize the untapped potentials of men ....).
93

For a more detailed explanation of this intersection, see REDISH, supranote 86, at 22-26.

94

See id.
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mitment to a democratic form of government because-as the classical democratic theorists argued-democracy enables individuals to develop their
human faculties and control their own destinies. 95
Whatever value one derives from a democratic system, there can be little
question that a commitment to democracy logically dictates a commitment to
free expression. As Professor Meiklejohn so forcefully argued, performance
of the self-governing function is significantly enhanced by the free flow of
information and opinion that makes the electorate more informed decisionmakers. 96 Moreover, free speech helps individuals develop emotionally
and intellectually, thereby fostering the developmental values long thought
to underlie precepts of classical democratic theory. 97 The concept of free
speech, then, flows from the same overarching value that underlies the commitment to democracy in the first place, and if society chooses the latter
political structure, society also must protect the former.
The positive rationales for the protection of free expression focus on the
benefits that the speech brings to individuals, both personal and political, and
to society as a whole. This Article next considers the manner in which extending full protection to corporate speech fosters these values and benefits.
2.

Corporations,Social Welfare, and the Democratic Process

Whichever normative conclusion one reaches about the role that corporations should play in modern society,98 it would be difficult to deny corporate activity's enormous impact on both the nation's welfare and the
government's success. Issues such as the best means to avoid inflation and
unemployment-both of which may well be as attributable to business performance as they are to government decisionmaking-are only two of the
many socio-economic issues facing the polity. 99 Moreover, even governmental decisions that do not deal directly with economic issues can have a significant impact on the economy and therefore a potentially significant effect on
corporate well-being.
Professor David Millon has described this intersection as the "public
law" conception of corporate law, 100 which acknowledges the substantial societal significance of corporate activity.1 1 This conception represents a theoretical recognition that, at some level, Charles Wilson was correct in asserting
that General Motors' welfare is intertwined with the country's welfare. 102
95 See supra note 92.
96 See Meiklejohn, supra note 85, at 263.
97 See supra note 92.
98 See infra notes 106-109 and accompanying text.
99 See LINDBLOM, supranote 4, at 172-73 (noting that "economic distress can bring down a
government").
100 See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DuKn L.J. 201, 252.
101 See id. at 201 (recognizing that "corporate activity has broad social and political ramifications"); see also JAMs WILLARD HURST, THE LEGrrIMACY OF THE BusINESS CORPORATION
IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 162 (1970) (recognizing the "idea that the corporation's
utility served the general economy"); LINDBLOM, supra note 4, at 175 (viewing businesses as
performing "indispensable" functions).
102 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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Recognition of the public-corporate intersection acknowledges that corporate use of economic power will inevitably have a social and political impact beyond the narrow interests of the corporation itself.10 3 In the words of
political scientist Peter Bachrach, corporate leaders "significantly influence
societal values directly and in the short run. And once a national issue has
come to public attention, they frequently exercise their influence whether
they want to or not. Their sheer existence, owing to their size, power, ubiquity, and public acceptance, leaves them no alternative."' 10 4 Economist Adolf
Berle long ago recognized that "[t]he corporation [had become], essentially,
a nonstatist political institution."' 0 5
A number of scholars do not find this reality to constitute a positive
development. One commentator, for example, has argued that because the
economy's health generally is dependent upon the magnitude of corporate
expenditures on capital goods, "public policy necessarily tends to be oriented,
especially over the long run, in a direction which is fundamentally in line with
the interests of the great corporate enterprises. And this will be true even if
06
the interests of the giants are in conflict with other social goals.'
In a similar vein, Professor Lindblom has pointed to what he describes as
the danger of "circularity": the fear that, because of corporate power's distorting effect, political choices are effectively made by the very economic interests that the system was intended to regulate. 107 In the words of Professor
Fiss, under the circularity principle, "[v]oters were not actually considering
the continued viability of capitalism, the justness of market distributions, or
the structure within which organized labor was allowed to act because.., of
the control exercised by corporate interests over the political agenda."' 0 8
Even a casual examination of modern history tends to show, however,
that Professor Lindblom substantially overstates the level of political power
that "dominant" corporate interests exercise. It would be absurd, of course,
to suggest that large corporate interests have exercised little or no influence
over modern economic and regulatory policies. But the very creation of the
New Deal, as well as the enactment of the social welfare legislation of the
"Great Society" programs in the 1960s, the heavy federal regulation of the
tobacco and drug industries, and the modern congressional failure to enact
federal tort reform legislation that would substantially benefit corporate defendants, all tend to demonstrate that large corporate interests have not al103 See HussT, supranote 101, at 58-59 (arguing that performing socially useful and responsible functions legitimizes corporations' use of the facilities that the law provides).
104

PETER BACHRACH, THE THEORY OF DEMocRAnc ELITISM: A CRIQuE 80 (1967).

Professor Bachrach cites United States Steel Corporation's response to the civil rights struggle in
Birmingham in 1963: "Under pressure, it declared its neutrality and thus was forced to admit to
itself and to the nation that it is a separate political institution." Id.
105 ADoLE A. BERLE, JR., THE 20rH CENTuRY CAPrrALasT REVOLTMON 60 (1954); see also

id. at 181 (asserting that "the corporation, almost against its will, has been compelled to assume
in appreciable part the role of conscience-carrier of twentieth-century American society").
106 Morton S. Baratz, Corporate Giants and the Power Structure, 9 W. PoL. Q. 406, 413

(1956).
107 See LINDBLOM, supra note 4, at 201-21.
108 Fiss, supra note 14, at 10.
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ways had their way in the political process. 10 9 Indeed, one probably could
make an empirical case that over the last two-thirds of the twentieth century,

the political power exercised by organized labor has been at least as great as
that of the corporate giants. It likely would be more accurate to state that
the corporate interest is merely one of several powerful voices that are
widely heard in the political process.
More important for present purposes, Professor Lindblom's analysis can
have no relevance to the issue of First Amendment protection for corporate

speech because the analysis is inherently and substantively viewpoint-based.
In other words, Lindblom's entire theory is premised on the normative as-

sumption that governmental regulation of economic interests is itself a good.
The theory thus adopts a normative position on a fundamental substantive
political issue, which is, of course, perfectly appropriate. Yet in shaping the
structure of First Amendment protection, it is entirely inappropriate to proceed on the basis of one particular set of substantive political value
choices. 1 0° The whole point of the First Amendment, rather, is to allow free
and open debate on the merits of competing approaches to those very issues.

Thus, freed-as it constitutionally must be-from its moorings in normative
economic and political philosophy, Professor Lindblom's theory merely underscores the empirical accuracy of the asserted intersection between issues
affecting corporate interests and those affecting the polity as a whole.
The public law understanding of the corporation's role, then, rests upon

a view of the profitmaking corporation as a participant in the policy deliberations of the government and as a performer of a leadership role in the political-economic order."' These realities have significant and obvious
implications for the scope of First Amendment protection to be extended to

corporate expression. Because of their expertise, resources, and incentives,
corporations are uniquely suited to provide the electorate with information

that will make it more informed as to many of the socio-economic issues
facing the nation. Moreover, the very fact that a major profitmaking corporation is of the opinion that a particular candidate or a particular policy is
109 See, e.g., S. 5148, 104th Cong. § 671 (1995) (discussing a later-rejected proposal on punitive damages); H.R. 161, 104th Cong. (1995) (discussing a later-rejected proposal to reform
product liability law); 21 C.F.R. § 897.1-.34 (1997) (regulating the sale, distribution, advertising,
and labeling of tobacco).
110 See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the FirstAmendment, 25 WM.
& MARY L. Rav. 189, 231-33 (1983) (distinguishing between content-based and content-neutral
restrictions on speech and emphasizing the unique risks inherent in viewpoint-based restrictions); see also infra notes 355-370 and accompanying text. It should be emphasized that Professor Lindblom did not purport to draw First Amendment implications from his observation.
Professor Fiss, however, does appear to do so. See Fiss, supra note 14, at 10-12.
111 See LINDBLOM, supra note 4, at 178-79. Actually, Professor Lindblom emphasizes business officials' role in public policy. See id. at 179. Because the official does not necessarily speak
or act on the corporation's behalf, however, we can extend Lindblom's idea to the corporation.
Cf HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RmasTaEN, THE CORPORTION AND TIE CoNsrrTTON 6364 (1995) (explaining that regulation of officials' speech creates First Amendment concerns because such speech is seen as the individual manager's speech); Manuel F. Cohen, The Corporation within the Community, in THE CORPORATION IN A DEMOCRATIC SocIETY 28,34 (Edward J.
Bander ed., 1975) (address to the Economic Club of Detroit) (noting that the "corporation as an
institution is, in fact, invested with political powers").
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important to the community's prosperity may reasonably influence individual
judgments on the matter.112 The corporate position, of course, need not be
accepted, but it should be made available as one option for the polity to
assess.
Recognizing both the role that corporations play in a democratic society
and their potential influence over government policies logically dictates the
extension of full First Amendment protection to corporate speech. Any
other conclusion would give rise to the anomalous and counterproductive
deprivation from the polity of potentially valuable input into the exercise of
3
their self-governing power."
Professor Lindblom has argued that profitmaking corporations have
"become a kind of public official and exercise what, on a broad view of their
role, are public functions."' "1 4 This insight helps to explain the modem treatment of plaintiff corporations in defamation actions. The Court has recognized a strong state interest in protecting corporations from statements that
are "clearly damaging" to their reputations." 5 This recognition is consistent
with a view of the corporation as concerned with something beyond its internal constitution and the bottom line."16 The Court also has recognized that
corporate plaintiffs are public figures for purposes of First Amendment defamation standards, 117 and thus, in order to recover damages, a corporation
must demonstrate that a false statement was made with "'actual malice'that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not."118 The standard's original premise was the need to insulate speakers from libel damages to insure that "debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." 119 The public law conception
120
of the corporation is fully consistent with that underlying premise.
112 See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 694 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting the significance of the fact that private associations owning and operating
much of the state's business believe that a particular candidate is important to the state's
prosperity).
113 Cf. Meiklejohn, supra note 85, at 255-56 (stating that the First Amendment dictates
absolute protection of expression that aids the citizenry in making governing choices).
114 LINDBLOM, supra note 4, at 172.
115 See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985)

(plurality opinion) (asserting that speech damaging to a corporation's reputation is unwarranting
of special protection).
See HusT, supra note 101, at 162.
117 See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 489-90 (1984)

116

(adopting a district court finding that the corporation was a public figure) (citing New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,279 (1964)); see also Snead v. Redland Aggregates Ltd., 998
F.2d 1325, 1329 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying a three-part analysis to determine whether a corpora-

tion is a public or private figure). But see Dun & Bradstreet,472 U.S. at 753 (plurality opinion)
(treating action involving a plaintiff corporation as governed by the standards for a private
individual).
118

New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (setting the fault standard for a suit by a public

official). The Court later extended this standard to so-called "public figures." See Curtis Publ'g

v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 336 n.7 (1974) (noting that a majority of Justices in Curtis Publishingagreed
that the New York Times test applies to public figures as weli as public officials).
"19 New York Tunes, 376 U.S. at 270.
120 See Patricia Nassif Fetzer, The Corporate Defamation Plaintiff as First Amendment
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At the same time, viewing corporations as public figures for New York
Times purposes underscores the important socio-political role that corporations play in society. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,121 the Court held that

private-person plaintiffs were not subject to the actual malice standard, relying in part on the fact that public plaintiffs "usually enjoy significantly greater
access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more

realistic opportunity to counteract false statements."' 2 2 In other words, public persons have the ability to use mass media to speak in their own defense
and contradict or correct the false statements.
In extending public figure status to a large corporation, the Court recognized that a business corporation enjoys "increased and more meaningful ac-

cess to channels of communication for rebutting defamatory falsehood."' 23

In so doing, the Court necessarily assumed that the corporation possesses the

constitutional right to use those channels and to speak in its own defense. If
the state can burden or otherwise interfere with corporate speech, the logic
of Gertz would not permit the actual malice standard to apply to

corporations.
One could argue, of course, that the corporate response to a defamatory
statement serves an important role in furthering and protecting the corporation's business, because a corporate rebuttal to that false statement is neces-

sary to maintain the corporation's reputation and thus maintain a profitable
business. Such expression might be distinguishable from speech surrounding
a candidate election campaign, which arguably is not necessary to maintain

the corporate reputation. 124 The two categories, however, share many simi-

larities. The economic and regulatory choices made by elected officials can
significantly affect corporations' profitability and success.' 2 5 Thus, corporate
"PublicFigure":Nailing the Jellyfish, 68 IowA L. Rnv. 35, 85 (1982) (asserting that "[flew would

dispute.., that a Ford Motor Company or an IBM command at least the same name recognition" as most public figures); Norman Redlich, The Publicly Held Corporationas Defamation
Plaintiff,39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1167, 1172 (1995) ("[A] corporation that has become a 'household

name' in the relevant community will be deemed an 'all purpose' public figure ....
121 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
122 Id. at 344. The second reason for the distinction between public and private plaintiffs in
Gertz was the fact that public officials and public figures voluntarily had sought to enter the
public eye and thus ran the risk of closer public scrutiny and possible defamation. See id.
at 345;
see also Redlich, supra note 120, at 1173 (noting that advertising may "thrust" a corporation into
some controversy).
123 Fetzer, supra note 120, at 54. This ability to respond to a falsehood is derived from the
decision in Bellotti and the expansive protection given to commercial speech. See id. at 54-55; see
also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 (1983) (holding that mailing contraceptive advertisements is "clearly protected by the First Amendment"); Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1980) (reasoning that commercial
speech is protected because it "furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination
of information"); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (rejecting the argument that the flow of price information on prescription
drugs is not protected by the First Amendment).
124 See O'Kelley, supra note 6, at 1360 (arguing that corporations possess "the constitutional rights necessary to protect their business[es]"); cf.Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 678 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (noting the vast difference between
political campaigns and other speech).
125 See LiNDBLOM, supra note 4, at 172-75; supra notes 113-105 and accompanying text.
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interests may be promoted as much by expression endorsing candidates or
commenting on public issues as by speech responding to defamatory
statements.
3. Corporations,Democratic Theory, and the Concept of "Catalytic SelfRealization"
Respected scholars-in particular, Professors Baker and Bezansonhave argued that corporate speech is undeserving of First Amendment protection because such expression fails to foster the values of personal liberty
and self-expression that exclusively underlie the free speech right. 2 6 Far
from being the product of a voluntarily chosen expression of the inner self,
they contend, corporate speech amounts to nothing more than a mechanistic,
involuntary attempt to maximize profits, ineluctably dictated by the corporate entity's inherent nature. 127
Their rejection of First Amendment protection for corporate speech,
then, derives from both the absence of a human source of the expression and
the existence of its inexorable profit motivation. The corporate ideas do not
originate with any single individual or other intentional communicative act,
they argue, and the speech does not reflect any individual's voluntarily
adopted political views.'2 Professor Bezanson argued that speech by a business entity is "a machine programmed in a general direction which, when fed
by the owners, channels its energy to particular ends that cannot be predicted
at the time of feeding."'129

Such a theory, of course, totally ignores whatever self-developmental
benefit corporate expression might have on that expression's recipients.
Whether one should accept such a truncated version of the value of free expression in the first place is itself questionable. 130 But even were we to assume, solely for purposes of argument, that to fall within the First
Amendment's protective umbrella expression must be the voluntarily chosen
product of a self-realizing individual or association of individuals, it still
would not follow that corporate speech is undeserving of constitutional protection. Such a conclusion improperly ignores both the important elements
of voluntary human choice that enter into individuals' resort to the corporate
form in the first place and the means by which the corporate form facilitates
the realization of the goals set by those individuals. The profitmaking corporation should be seen as an important catalyst in the process of individual
126 See generally BAKER, supra note 13, at 219 (arguing that corporate speech "does not
depend on either individual or collective visions about what humanity should be" and "need not

reflect anyone's substantive political views"); Bezanson, supra note 13, at 739 (asserting that
"institutional speech . . . has nothing to do with liberty and no necessary relationship to

freedom").
127 See BAKER, supra note 13, at 218 (arguing that "business considerations may dictate the

content of the company's political speech").
128 See id. at 219; Bezanson, supra note 13, at 755-56.
129 Bezanson, supra note 13, at 779.
130 For a detailed critique, see REDISH, supra note 86, at 29-36.
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self-realization, as has long been recognized in the case of unincorporated
131
associations and nonprofit corporations.
Alexis de Tocqueville recognized that the right and ability of individuals

to form voluntary associations constituted an integral part of the fabric of
American democratic society, in which the people had "carried to the highest
perfection the art of pursuing in common the object of their common
desires" and applied it to the "greatest number of purposes." 132 Americans
associated not only for exclusively political purposes, he noted, but also for
"commercial and manufacturing companies" and for all purposes "serious,
futile, general or restrictive, enormous or diminutive. ' 133 As was the case for
political activity, such associations were deemed necessary to enhance the

powers of individually powerless citizens by allowing them to unite in order
134
to amass power.

As previously noted, democracy is most appropriately characterized as a
system both logically dependent upon and designed to further the self-reali-

zation value. 135 Associations may serve effectively as important vehicles
through which individuals attain the personal and economic goals that they

have set for themselves. We refer to this process as "catalytic self-realization" because these associations serve as catalysts in enabling people to use
and develop their human faculties and control their own destinies by pursu-

ing their chosen purposes in society.
The business corporation arose from much the same associational goals
grounded in democratic theory as did other forms of association. 136 Indeed,
the most common purpose of civil associations in the 1830s, other than political parties, was to further commerce and manufacturing. 137 Such organiza-

tions were examples of the many associations of individuals deemed by
Tocqueville to be necessary elements of a democratic society. Indeed, during
the Jacksonian period, the corporation was seen as a means to equalize other-

wise unbalanced competing economic forces.138 Absent the special economic

131 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (holding that
forced disclosure of the association's membership list would violate the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of association); id. at 460 ("[I]t is beyond debate that freedom to engage in
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty'
assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of
speech.").
132 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 130 (Henry Reeve trans., 1862).
133 Id. at 129; see also id. at 140-41 (discussing the link between the existence of political
and other civil associations).
134 See id. at 140-41; see also id. at 130 (describing the American view of association as "the
only means they have of acting").
135 See REDISH, supra note 86, at 20; supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text.
136 See HUgs'r, supra note 101, at 32 (describing the corporation as historically "a useful
instrument of regular business.").
137 Cf. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 132, at 129 (noting that almost all Americans took part in
commercial and manufacturing companies).
138 According to one commentator, the Jacksonian period was marked by "the transfer of
economic primacy from an old and conservative merchant class to a newer, more aggressive, and
more numerous body of business men and speculators of all sorts." BRAY HAMMOND, SOVEREIONrY AND AN EMrY PURSE: BANKS AND POLITICS IN =a CIVIL WAR (1970), reprinted in
CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 216, 218 (Allen F. Davis & Harold
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and legal advantages of the corporate form, individual entrepreneurs who
lacked personal fortunes were unable to compete effectively with those who
possessed such wealth. Thus, the corporation's growth represented "the economic aspect of the policital [sic] and social forces that democratized the
United States during the Age of Jackson."'1 39 Corporations were recognized
140
as "useful instrument[s] of regular business.'
Although corporations historically were subjected to some degree of attack on equality grounds, according to a leading authority, "[t]he compatibility of corporate status with individual equality under law raised issues of
procedure rather than of substance .... The valid egalitarian point was simply that [the corporate form] should be available by a simple procedure on
41
equal terms to all who saw use for them in ordinary business associations.'
To enhance the success of such organizations, states legislatively authorized general incorporation, which made the formation of business corporations and individual investment in them easier and more commonplace. 142

Thus, during and after the presidency of Andrew Jackson, corporations not
only were deemed not inconsistent with the individual equality precept but
actually represented a response to the "demand that all should have reason143
ably equal access to the benefits of incorporation."'
D. Woodman eds., 1984). Hammond notes that the period "produced a dazzling democratic
expansion experienced nowhere else," and that "the Jacksonian revolution signified that a nation
of democrats was tired of being governed, however well, by gentlemen from Virginia and Massachusetts." Id. at 217. Jacksonianism, he states, "opened economic advantages to those who had
not previously had them." Id.
139 RONALD E. SEAvoY, Tim OIGINS OF THE AmRIcAN BusINass CORPORATION, 17841855, at 256 (1982). According to Professor Hovenkamp,
[c]lassical political economy in the United States is a Jacksonian phenomenon .... Andrew Jackson was an entrepreneurial president. His terms of officeor, in political economic terms, his regime-stood for economic growth, unobstructed by "artificial" constraints. The two greatest classical legal institutions in
the United States-the modern business corporation and the constitutional doctrine of substantive due process-are both distinctively Jacksonian products. The
modern business corporation had its origin in the general corporation acts, one of
the most important legal accomplishments of a regime bent on democratizing and
deregulatingAmerican business.
HOVENKA P, supra note 2, at 2 (emphasis added).
140 HuRsT, supra note 101, at 32.
141 Id; see also SEAVOY, supra note

139, at 256 (arguing that general incorporation laws
"helped equalize the opportunities to get rich").
142 See HunsT, supranote 101, at 120 (citing the common example of the New York constitutional convention of 1846); see also SEAVOY, supra note 139, at 255 (noting that Connecticut
was the first state to adopt a policy of granting charters to any legitimate business).
143 HuRsT, supranote 101, at 120; see also id. at 32 (noting that the "individualistic egalitarian objection passed out of [the] Jacksonian [arguments] against corporations"). Professor
Hovenkamp asserted that
[t]o be a classicist was to be opposed to state intervention on behalf of the rich and
the politically powerful. Classicism achieved its popularity in the United States in a
political movement, Jacksonianism, that was heavily supported by society's disfavored classes. The issues were not welfare and subsidized education. Rather, they
were special corporate charters or licenses that gave unique privileges to engage in
business to certain favored people, while denying access to others. When Federalists intervened in the market, the immediate beneficiaries were generally people of
property.
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Although it would be naive to suggest that the role played by the modem corporation is identical to that of its Jacksonian ancestor, the existence of
many striking similarities appears to have been lost in the shuffle of politics
and history. One should not forget that ultimately the "corporation is its
people and they are not detached from society."'144 Hence, for purposes of
the self-realization theory, one should view the corporation as merely one
form of voluntary association, an aggregation of talent and resources, consciously entered into by individuals. In so doing, these individuals are seeking to self-realize by engaging and investing in business and by participating
in and personally benefiting from the political-economic system through the
power of collective action. 145 The corporate form enables individuals to pool
their resources and, like other associations, pursue their chosen goals in a
more efficient and effective manner. It also enables individuals to engage in
business and investment activity that they otherwise would be unable to perform as effectively absent the availability of that associational form .1 46 Further, it enables these individuals to speak in support of attaining those
economic goals in a stronger, more effective voice. 147 In short, the business
corporation may serve as a catalyst for the process of individual selfrealization.
This analysis applies as much to the use of the corporate form in the
economic arena as it does to the use of association in the political arena.
Much as a common trust fund, composed of a grouping of smaller individual
trusts, is designed and intended to geometrically increase investment benefits
on the basis of the aggregated capital,14 an individual shareholder's or corporate manager's ability to realize his economic goals can be magnified many
times in both breadth and force.
The corporation's use of expression may significantly further fulfillment
of the corporation's purpose. Just as that associational form serves as a catalyst to the attainment of individual self-realization, so, too, does the corporate entity's speech play an important role in the attainment of the goals that
its managers and investors have set for it. The activity of associating provides
not only for collective and powerful action but also for a collective and powerful voice. The speaker whose individual message might not be as effective
standing alone gains audibility and effectiveness by advocating her positions
supra note 2, at 4.
Milton Friedman & Eli Goldston, The "Responsible" Corporation:Benefactor or Monopolist?, FORTUNE, Nov. 1973, at 56, reprinted in Tim CORPORATION IN A DEMOCRATC SOCIETY, supra note 111, at 43, 44 (statement of Goldston).
145 See id. (statement of Goldston) (describing large publicly held corporations as "social
aggregations of talent"); cf. Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125
U.S. 181, 189 (1888) (noting that "corporations are merely associations of individuals united for
a special purpose").
146 Cf. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 132, at 131-32 (reasoning that individuals gain power and
independence from the ability to form associations).
HOVENKAMP,
144

147 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) ("Effective advocacy... is undeniably enhanced by group association .... ").
148 See generally Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)
(describing the common trust fund concept).
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through group association. 149 A group can explain, advance, defend, and
seek support for its purposes or positions in a manner that most individuals
could not hope to achieve acting alone. This is especially true of the corporation, with its emphasis on centralized and efficient decisionmaking and
action.
The fact that a corporation's speech is directed toward the goal of economic gain should not distinguish it from other associational forms for First
Amendment purposes. It is surely not uncommon for means of expression or
communication to further one's economic interests. One may advance such
interests by persuading or influencing government or private individuals or
entities either to take action or refrain from taking action. Just as the individual's ability to maximize economic gain increases geometrically by resort to
the streamlined methods of the corporate form, so, too, does the individual's
ability to communicate in an effort to increase profits expand dramatically
when filtered through the corporation's structure. It is therefore appropriate
to recognize how use of the corporate form may magnify dramatically the
communication's power and reach.
The fact that the corporation's primary purpose and function is not itself
expression or communication also should not in any way reduce the level of
First Amendment protection given to corporate speech. In its instrumental
form, speech is not an end in itself but rather a means of facilitating personal
or collective goals. 150 Thus, expression that fosters attainment of nonexpressive goals fits well within the First Amendment's theoretical framework.
4. CorporateSpeech and the Listener's FirstAmendment Right
Even if one ultimately rejected either the catalytic self-realization concept in the abstract or its specific application to corporations,'15 it does not
necessarily follow that corporate speech falls outside the bounds of the First
Amendment. Such expression can serve an important function in both fostering the democratic process on a collective level and assisting in the selfrealization of its recipients on an individual level. Recognizing the role
played by free expression as a facilitator of the democratic process 152 necessarily implies that a free flow of information and opinion is essential for an
individual to make life-affecting choices. Likewise, individuals develop their
personal and intellectual faculties by receiving and processing information.
149 See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460; see also MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GovERNMNr SPEAKS
161-62 (1983) (asserting that organizations represent the mass of individuals who rarely can provide a powerful voice on their own); Victor Brudney, Association, Advocacy, and the First
Amendment, 4 WM. & MARY BILL Rrs. J. 1, 79 (1995) ("[A]ssociations are essentially amplifiers . . . or in any event communicators, of individual expressive interests .... "); Meir DanCohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected Communications by Organizations, Communities, and the State, 79 CAL. L. REv. 1229, 1249 (1991) (arguing that individuals
speak through organizations knowing that their "views will gain greatly in audibility").
150 See REDISH, supra note 86, at 19-22.
151 But see supra notes 144-150 and accompanying text.

152 See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text; see also Meiklejohn, supra note 85, at
256-57 (describing how the enjoyment of art, literature, and education cultivates citizens' values,
independence, and wisdom); id. at 263 (arguing that novels, dramas, paintings, and poems en-

hance people's ability to vote).
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The value of self-realization, as one of us has previously argued, "may be

fostered as much by the receipt of expression as by the act of expressing.'

53

Because the listener and the speaker receive the identical benefit from the

speech, the listener's rights should be recognized as an independent basis on
which to protect expression.

54

A focus on the interests of the expression's recipients has played a
venerable role in the development of modem free speech theory. Most significant is Professor Meiklejohn's politically-based theory of free speech,
which viewed as the primary concern "not that everyone shall speak, but that

everything worth saying shall be said."' 55 This approach protects "those activities of thought and communication by which we govern.'

56

To

Meiklejohn, speech's value lay entirely in enabling voters to "acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general welfare" necessary to act in a democratic government. 157 This ability derives

from the receipt of "information or opinion or doubt or disbelief or criticism
which is relevant to that issue."'158 According to Meiklejohn, the First
Amendment prohibits government from preventing individuals from learning
any opinions or ideas relevant to the governing process.

59

An individual

thus is exercising her First Amendment rights when she receives and intellectually processes information and opinion. The Court has recognized this in-

dependently grounded listener's right to receive information and ideas as a
"necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights
of speech, press, and political freedom.'

60

153 REDISH, supra note 86, at 30; see id.at 50; see also MniKtaLo-n, supra note 90, at 27
(arguing that the result will be "ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general good" if
citizens must decide an issue with less than complete information).
154 See David A. Strauss, Persuasion,Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L.
RFv. 334, 371 (1991) (arguing that "freedom of expression is designed to protect the autonomy
of potential listeners").
155 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 90, at 26; see id. ("It does not require that, on every occasion,
every citizen shall take part in public debate. Nor can it even give assurance that everyone shall
have opportunity to do so."). This is not to endorse entirely this aspect of Professor
Meiklejohn's theory because in many ways his theory is too limiting, most notably in his argument that the same message should not be repeated, see id., and his limitation of speech protection only to public, or political, speech. See id. at 83; REDISH, supra note 86, at 14-15 (critiquing
the Meiklejohnian approach).
156 Meiklejohn, supra note 85, at 255.
157 Id.; see also id. at 263 (arguing that the "judgment-making of the people must be selfeducated in the ways of freedom").
158 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 90, at 27; see also Meiklejohn, supra note 85, at 256-57 (arguing that the spreading of information and ideas must be unabridged).
159 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 90, at 27; Meiklejohn, supra note 85, at 256-57.
160 Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (plurality opinion); see also Stanley v.
is now well established that the Constitution
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (stating that "[i]t
protects the right to receive information and ideas"); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301,
308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if
otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and consider them."); Burt Neubome,
Speech, Technology, and the Emergence of a TricameralMedia: You Can't Tell the Players Without a Scorecard, 17 HASTINGS Comm.& Err. LJ.17, 30-31 & n.58 (1994) (stating that "[e]ntire
categories of speech arose where the principal justification for First Amendment protection was
the hearer's right to know," including corporate and commercial speech); Strauss, supra note
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This analysis provides an independent basis for protecting corporate
speech in order to protect the First Amendment rights of those potential listeners who will hear, process, learn from, and make decisions based partially
upon this information. 161 This logic in large part provided the basis for the
Court's initial decision to protect corporate speech in Bellotti, in which the
Court emphasized the First Amendment's "role in affording the public access
to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas" and in
prohibiting the "government from limiting the stock of information from
which members of the public may draw."'162
The conceivable response that the listener's right does not justify protection of corporate speech because others will convey the same opinion or information is unpersuasive for several reasons. Initially, the identity of the
source of speech may matter in providing context to the message as "an important component of many attempts to persuade.' 63 The message's overall
nature may change when the messenger changes; similarly, the degree of effectiveness and credibility may change depending on the source. 164 The same
statement from different speakers may constitute a different message. As the
Court has noted, an "espousal of socialism may carry different implications
when displayed on the grounds of a stately mansion than when pasted on a
factory wall or on an ambulatory sandwich board."'1 65 Thus, recognition of
154, at 371 ("[F]reedom of expression is designed to protect the autonomy of potential listeners

161 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (plurality
opinion) ("First Amendment protects the public's interest in receiving information."); see also
DAN-CoHEN, supra note 14, at 109 (arguing that business corporations have a right to speak
derived from the public's right to listen); Dan-Cohen, supra note 149, at 1245 (protecting corporate speech because the corporation is a "source of communication to which the public is entitled
to listen"); Shelledy, supra note 6, at 571 (arguing that corporate speech can add to the "limited
range of views given widespread dissemination").
162 First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); see also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 706 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (rejecting the suggestion
that government has an interest in shaping debate by insulating the electorate from certain
views); id. at 695 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The premise of our system is that there is no such thing
as too much speech ... ."). But see J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics:Is the
FirstAmendment an Obstacleto PoliticalEquality?, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 609, 641 (1982) (arguing
that Bellotti "paid only lip service to the rights of listeners" and really was more concerned with
protecting "the privileged few who can spend unlimited amounts of money to purchase political
effectiveness").
163 City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994).
164 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 791-92 (stating that the people in a democracy "may consider ... the source and credibility of the advocate"); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH INAN

OPEN SocmTY 235 (1992) ("The effectiveness of speech is often connected to the identity of the
speaker."); see also Austin, 494 U.S. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that listeners will
consider the "self-interested and probably uncongenial source" in evaluating a message);
YUDOF, supra note 149, at 161 (arguing that sources of information must have "high claims to
legitimacy in the public mind"); C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of Personsand Presses, 1994 Sup. CT. REv. 57, 65. ("Many listeners lind that the identity of
the source affects the worth or at least their evaluation of the speech."); Martin H. Redish,
ProductHealth Claims and the FirstAmendment: Scientific Expression and the Twilight Zone of
CommercialSpeech, 43 VArD. L. REv. 1433,1456-57 (1990) (arguing that a listener may be more
skeptical of a claim made by a business corporation than by an objective observer).
165 Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 56-57. "A sign advocating 'Peace in the Gulf' in the front lawn of a
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the listener's right logically dictates that all possible different versions of a
statement may be made available for the listeners to see and react to in their
own ways. 166 To a listener who dislikes or mistrusts corporations or big busi-

nesses, explicit support for a candidate or issue by a powerful corporation
might dictate that listener's opposition to that candidate. Conversely, a person who approves of the role and influence of corporations might be predisposed to agree with the message for the very same reason. In either case,
that message, with the. corporation as its source, is relevant to the individ167
ual's decision.

More important, it is by no means clear that the same information or
opinion will be disseminated-at least anywhere near as effectively-absent
corporate contributions to public debate. Corporations invariably will possess both the economic incentive and resources to express their views effec-

tively and persuasively. We cannot be certain that any other entities or
individuals will possess either quality to anywhere near the same extent or
degree. Ironically, although it is the corporation's wealth and power that
often causes opponents of corporate speech to call for its restriction, 168 that
very power is what makes corporate speech most valuable to the facilitation
of both the democratic process and the listener's self-realization. The result
of restricting the corporate voice, then, is that debate on a political issue is

considerably less "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"'169 than the First
Amendment commands.
Professors Baker and Bezanson have argued, however, that the exclusive
basis of First Amendment protection is the volitional speaker's liberty. To
them, the key is the act of speaking, not the speech itself.170 Because a cor-

poration's speech is "speakerless," under their view, it is not entitled to protection. 171 This is one of several conceivable rationales to support the view

that the listener's rights are irrelevant if the speaker has no independently
grounded right to speak. 172 The problem with such an argument is that it
retired general or decorated war veteran may provoke a different reaction than the same sign in
a 10-year-old child's bedroom window ..... Id.at 56.
166 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 782 n.18 ("Certainly there are voters ...
who would be as
interested in hearing appellants' views on a graduated tax as the views of media corporations
that might be less knowledgeable on the subject."); see also Austin, 494 U.S. at 699 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "corporations... [may] have unique views of vital importance to the
electorate" that should not be muted); cf.Redish, supra note 164, at 1456-57 (describing different, more skeptical reactions to a statement when coming from a business corporation).
167 Cf Austin, 494 U.S. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that listeners will consider the
corporate source of the message and might find it uncongenial).
168 See infra notes 305-354 and accompanying text.
169 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
170 See Baker, supra note 164, at 73; Bezanson, supra note 13, at 739; see also id. at 740
(calling the First Amendment the "guarantee of individual freedom to speak"). But see
Meiklejohn, supra note 85, at 255 ("The First Amendment does not protect a 'freedom to
speak."').
171 See Bezanson, supra note 13, at 739.
172 See Baker, supra note 164, at 73 ("[W]ithout speakers, listeners' autonomy is irrelevant.... [T]he listener's desire to hear something seldom gives her the right to hear it unless
some speaker has both the right (or bureaucratically defined duty) and desire to talk."); id. at 78
(arguing that "listener autonomy offers very little protection without prior invocation of speaker
autonomy"); Brudney, supra note 149, at 68 ("If there exists a right to hear, it is only the right to
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circularly begs the very question that is the subject of the debate, because it
simply assumes that the listener has no rights absent a voluntary speaker's
existence. The argument thus fails to respond to the contention that the
speaker should have a right to speak for the very reason that the listener's
receipt of the expression would foster First Amendment values.
It is true, of course, that recognizing a listener's right could not reasonably force either an unwilling private speaker to speak 173 or the government
to disclose information it does not wish to divulge. Regardless of how one
ultimately resolves the debate about the "voluntariness" of corporate expression, 174 surely no external force is "compelling" the expression. Hence, accepting an independently grounded listener's right does, in fact, resolve the
issue of corporate speech protection.
A second argument against recognition of this independently grounded
listener's right, made by Professor Baker, focuses on the supposed lack of a
logical stopping point for that right. He discusses the fear that
this broad conception of respect for listener autonomy would prevent the government from denying the listener information even if
on balance it concludes that the speech does not contribute to the
good and even if it is acting either as a speaker or as a regulator of
175
entities that have no autonomy rights.

By his own words, however, Professor Baker demonstrates his analysis's
failure, for his words prove far too much. The government surely has no
power to control what a speaker can say based on what the government concludes does not contribute to the public good.176 Such a view necessarily
violates the premise of "epistemological humility" so fundamental to First
Amendment theory and doctrine. 177 Indeed, Professor Baker's own liberty
theory inherently recognizes this fact because he insists that "the collective
must respect the equality and autonomy of individuals," thus "limiting the
hear what others can and wish to say."); idat 72-73 (arguing that where no speaker exists, "the
audience has lost nothing to which it is entitled"); Brudney, supranote 6, at 247 (arguing that the
listener's interests are not independent of the speaker's ability and desire to speak).
173 See supra note 43 and accompanying text; cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714
(1977) (recognizing a First Amendment right against governmentally-compelled speech); West

Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-34, 642 (1943) (holding a compulsory flag salute

unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
174 See supra notes 126-131 and accompanying text.
175 Baker, supra note 164, at 78 (citations omitted).
176 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (stating that decisions
about what expressions to make, hear, or adopt rest with each individual), affd after remand,117

S. Ct. 1174 (1997); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 414 (1992) (White, J., concurring in
the judgment) ("The mere fact that expressive activity causes hurt feelings, offense, or resent-

ment does not render the expression unprotected."); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 (1989)
(upholding flag burning as protected speech, because although national unity is a proper official

end, the government may not achieve this end by arresting those who express disagreement);
Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (rejecting the "outrageousness" standard as
the boundary of actionable political speech); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,25 (1971) ("[O]ne

man's vulgarity is another's lyric.").
177 See Redish, supranote 164, at 1435 (discussing the "epistemological humility" concept);
Redish & Lippman, supranote 26, at 281 (connecting the Court's prohibition of viewpoint regulation with the construct of epistemological humility).
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collective's decisionmaking authority" and
permitting speech that the major178
ity may deem unwise or objectionable.
Once society grants to the government the power to prevent selectively
listeners from receiving expression based on the government's determination
of the public good, there is available no logical stopping point and therefore
no reason not to grant the government the same power to prevent speakers
from creating and disseminating expression that the government deems unwise. Professor Baker attempts to tie everything back to speaker-as opposed to listener-autonomy as the key element, the presence of which
determines which communications the government can or cannot restrict in
the name of the public good. 179 Yet, once it is recognized that both the
speaker and listener derive similar benefits from the autonomy involved in
the process of free expression, any rational basis for that distinction
disappears.
C. CorporateSpeech and the "Negative" Theory of the FirstAmendment
Although the free speech guarantee fosters the positive values associated with collective democracy and individual self-realization, the democratic
system's inherent vulnerability requires constant vigilance in order to ensure
that hostile forces do not undermine it. Thus, several theories concerning the
First Amendment's scope have focused wisely on speech's role in preventing
the government from acting in ways that may threaten tyranny's onset. This
negative conception is apparent in two approaches to First Amendment interpretation, both of which may be understood as subvalues that serve the
broader, more positive self-realization value. 180 First, and best known, is Professor Blasi's theory of the "checking" function, which focuses on the value
the First Amendment serves in checking governmental misconduct and public officials' abuse of power. 181 A second form of the negative theory seeks to
prohibit the government from artificially enhancing its own position and
power by controlling or manipulating individual choices. The government
may not seek to achieve its desired results by selectively censoring informa182
tion and opinion that might be relevant to those choices.
1.

Explaining "Negative" Free Speech Theory: The FirstAmendment as
a Check on Government

The best known of the negative theories is Professor Blasi's checking
function, which posits that the uppermost value of the First Amendment is
"checking the abuse of power by public officials.' 1 83 The central premise of
Blasi's theory is that the First Amendment's fundamental role is to counter
178 BAKER, supra note 13, at 55.

179 See Baker, supra note 164, at 78-79.
180 See supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text.
181 See Blasi, supra note 79, at 527.
182 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) ("Our whole constitutional heritage
rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds.").
183 Blasi, supra note 79, at 527.
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governmental misconduct by "facilitating a process by which countervailing
forces check the misuse of official power."' 184
The checking function employs an "essentially pessimistic view of
human nature and human institutions,"' 1 5 similar in many ways to the pessimistic view of human nature that underlies the separation of powers concept.
Both are based on recognizing the need for "countervailing power in a democratic state' 1 86 necessary to "control the abuses of government."' 18 7 As
Madison wrote in The Federalist, "[i]f angels were to govern men, neither
external nor internal controls on government would be necessary."' 88 Because that option obviously was not available, controls over the government
had to be institutionalized. 189 Separation of powers and the First Amendment's checking function both require formal, organized, and prophylactic
structures to continually police potential abuses before the government is allowed to subvert liberty. 190

As fashioned by Professor Blasi, the theory underlying the checking
function is plagued with ambiguities.' 9' For example, although Professor
Blasi describes the especially serious evil to which free speech protection is
directed as "misconduct by government officials,"'192 it is not clear whether he
intends to confine this concept to breaches of ethical or criminal prohibitions
by government officials, or to include as well any substantive governmental
decisions or choices deemed-by whom, it is also unclear-to be improper.
If he intends the latter, he fails to define adequately such a concept. Nevertheless, Blasi's recognition of the pessimistic underside of the First Amendment represents an important contribution to First Amendment thought, for
surely checking governmental abuse is an important role played by that constitutional protection. Examining the role potentially played by corporate
speech reveals that corporate speech may serve an important function in furthering the check of the government.
2. CorporateSpeech as a Governmental Check
The link between governmental performance on the one hand and business performance on the other, one should note, cuts in both directions.
Although the government may seek to assure that businesses perform fairly
184

Id.

Id. at 541.
Id. at 525; see Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J.Cisar, "If Angels Were to Govern". The
Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 Durr LJ.449, 463 (1991)
(arguing that separation of powers requires that each branch of government possess the "formal
tools necessary to limit the excesses of its rivals").
187 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 160 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 1966).
185
186

188 Id.

189 See Redish & Cisar, supra note 186, at 462.
190 Compare Redish & Cisar, supra note 186, at 476 (arguing that separation of powers
must operate before one branch has acquired an undue amount of power), with Blasi, supra note
79, at 541 (calling for "well-organized, well-financed, professional critics to serve as a
counterforce ... to pass judgment on the actions of government").
191 For a detailed critique of Professor Blasi's explication of the checking function, see
REDISH, supra note 86, at 41-45.
192 Blasi, supra note 79, at 538.
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and effectively, 193 businesses must likewise assure that the government performs in a similar manner. There is no better way to achieve this goal than

through the power of speech. The checking value demands protection for
speech by "institutions outside of government with the resources, energy, and
expertise to counter the government's messages" and actions. 194 The coun-

tervailing voices, according to Professor Blasi, should be "well-organized,
well-financed," and "capable of disseminating their information and judgments to the general public."'195
Of many organized constituencies that fit this description, one of the

potentially most effective is the profitmaking corporation. 196 Early in the nation's history, Tocqueville recognized that government should not be the only

active power. Rather, he argued, private "associations ought, in democratic
nations, to stand in lieu of those powerful private individuals whom the
equality of conditions has swept away."'1 97 The result is a political arena in
which three powerful entities-the government, the press, and private orga-

nizations-provide competing views and messages, a broader range of information, and a check on one another

98

Corporate speech, precisely because of both its power to disseminate
widely its message and its obvious underlying motivating force of economic
self-interest, can serve as an effective check on governmental excess. Often,
corporations will not have to rely on the government for their information.
They will formulate their own positions, usually according to the needs of
their business, broadly defined. They likely will possess the resources, exper-

tise, and economic incentive to disseminate broadly commentary and information on issues of social and economic policy.
Under the so-called "fourth estate" theory, it is primarily-if not exclusively-the institutional media that performs the checking function. 199 It is
unclear, however, why the checking function should be viewed in so trun193

See

194

YUDOF,

supra note 4, at 173.
supra note 149, at 161; see also id. (stating that checking institutions must be
"establishment organizations," with "high claims to legitimacy in the public mind").
LINDBLOM,

195 Blasi, supra note 79, at 541.
196 See YUDOF, supra note 149, at 161; Shelledy, supra note 6, at 573 (arguing that the

"existence of distinct corporate views and the ability of corporations to compete with government and press for public attention support the conclusion that corporate speech can enrich
public debate").
197 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 132, at 133; see also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 693-94 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting larger passage of de Tocqueville's argument).
198 See Shelledy, supra note 6, at 571 ("[Competition among three loud voices will provide
a more diverse discourse than a debate dominated by two .... ); cf Redish & Cisar, supra note
186, at 463 (describing the separation of powers in which each of the three branches possesses
the tools to restrict the other two in a prophylactic manner).
199 See BAKER, supra note 13, at 231-33 ("[T]he role of the press in exposing abuses of
power is likely to be central .. "); Floyd Abrams, The Press Is Different: Reflections on Justice
Stewart and the Autonomous Press,7 HOFsTRA L. REv. 563, 585 (1979) (arguing that the ability

to be an independent check on government is "unique to the press"); id. at 592 ("ITihe press is
the only institution that can serve on a continuing basis as an open eye of the public .... ");
Randall P. Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee,63 VA. L. REv. 731, 735 (1977) (asserting
that the press is a "check on government that no other institution could provide").
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cated a manner. As the Court noted in Bellotti, "the press does not have a
monopoly on either the First Amendment or the ability to enlighten," 200 or
on the ability to check government. Indeed, the presence of both expertise
and incentive on certain issues may well enable corporations to perform the
checking function considerably more effectively than the institutional media.201 As one commentator has correctly observed, "[i]t simply is not clear
that media speech contributes more significantly to the democratic dialogue
than does nonmedia speech." 202
Even if one were to assume, arguendo, that the press is the most effective check on the government, it does not follow that other speakers are incapable of also performing that function. Checking is a question of power,
resources, and incentive to perform the function; corporations generally possess all three.
Most important, when the government and the media are allied on a
particular issue-which has not been an infrequent occurrence-"the mass
media are likely to magnify government's messages, thereby undermining the
independence of the self-controlled citizen and increasing the tendency toward an authoritarian communications network. ' 20 3 The problem of a governmental-media alliance arguably reached its height during the Persian Gulf
War, during which the media gave virtually no coverage to those who were
critical of the decision to send troops into battle. 204 In other words, the public heard few, if any, strong dissenting voices from the media, the supposed
check on the government.
The need to check the government, then, is too important to be entrusted to only one group of speakers. Returning to the separation-of-powers analogy, the more that society subdivides power, presumably the smaller
the danger of tyranny. In the context of the checking function, the greater
the number of motivated and powerful private speakers, the smaller the danger of undue power centralization and unchecked governmental excess.
This conclusion, it should be emphasized, is in no way intended to imply
that corporate speech always will be wise, persuasive, or motivated by good
intentions. But the skeptical assumption underlying both separation-of-powers theory and the negative perspective of First Amendment theory is that
one can never fully trust the motivations of an individual or institution, private or governmental. 20 5 It is for that very reason that separation-of-powers
theory seeks to disperse influence among a variety of interests and institu200 First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 782-83 (1978); see also Abrams, supra note
199, at 587 (arguing that recognizing the press's unique role and status is not inconsistent with
granting broad First Amendment protections to others).
201 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 782 n.18.
202 David Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L. Rnv. 77, 103 (1975).
203 YUDOF, supra note 149, at 37.
204 See Steven Shiffrin, The Politics of the Mass Media and the Free Speech Principle, 69
IND. LJ.689, 708-09 (1994) (noting that during the first month of the war's coverage, Nightline
failed to feature any guest who opposed the government's actions). Political scientist Benjamin
Page has documented this charge. His empirical study demonstrates that the actual level of
opposition to the war was never accurately reflected in either news or editorial coverage. See
BENJAMIN I. PAGE, WHO DELIBERATES?: MASS MEDIA IN MODERN DEMOCRACY 26-37 (1996).
205 See MARTIN H. REDISH, THm CONSTIUnON AS PoLITICAL STRUCrUR 99-113 (1995).
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tions. Modern society must recognize private corporate power as one of
those interests. To the extent it does not, the inevitable result is that other
societal and governmental institutions will dangerously accrete even more
20 6
power than they already possess.
Once society recognizes the important role that corporations may play in
diffusing and checking societal power, governmental suppression of corporate speech takes on potentially ominous implications for avoiding political
power's centralization. One can never be sure whether restrictions on corporate expression are in reality nothing more than governmental attempts to
curb or intimidate a potential rival for societal authority. Hence, excluding
corporate speech from the First Amendment's reach would almost inevitably
have a detrimental impact on the most fundamental values underlying the
protection of free speech.
3. CorporateSpeech Restrictions as Thought Control
There are times when our system vests in private individuals or entities
the right to challenge governmental action, not so much because we are concerned about the harmful impact of that action on that individual or entity
but rather because we are troubled that the government would act in a particular manner. Further, we recognize that the affected party will have the
greatest incentive to act as the equivalent of a private attorney general in
seeking to check such governmental excess. The classic illustration of such a
practice is the ability of obviously guilty criminals to challenge violations of
207
their constitutional rights.
In shaping modern constitutional law, corporations are often the beneficiary of the law's methodologies. For example, corporations affected by a
federal regulation are deemed to have standing to challenge the regulation
on grounds of constitutional federalism. 20 8 This is true even though the concern underlying the challenge is not so much that the government is mistreating the corporation (after all, the state government could probably impose
the same regulation, consistent with governing principles of constitutional
federalism) but rather that the federal government might be exceeding its
constitutional powers within the federal system. Private corporations have
this power to bring suit presumably because their economic interests will provide the incentive to present the most effective possible challenge.
206 Cf. YUDOF, supra note 149, at 164 ("[I]t is incumbent upon the courts to cultivate the
ability of all institutions to counter government and one another.").
207 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,448 (1966) (allowing defendants to challenge
improper custodial interrogation procedures as violative of their Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination). Another example is the First Amendment's overbreadth doctrine.
Cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Overbreadth,1981 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 4 (stating that, in arguing a statute's
overbreadth, "claimant is asserting his own right not to be burdened by an unconstitutional rule
of law, though naturally the claim is not one which depends on the privileged character of his
own conduct" (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted)).
208 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262 (1964) (allowing, but rejecting on the merits, a corporation's challenge to the 1964 Civil Rights Act on
Commerce Clause grounds).
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Moreover, corporations can challenge governmental regulations as violations of procedural due process even though they are the same faceless,
mindless, and robotic profit maximizers that they supposedly are for free
speech purposes.20 9 At least in part, this is quite probably due to the fact that

we do not want our government behaving in certain ways, regardless of who
the victim is. Violation of basic notions of procedural due process is, apparently, one of those things we have decided we do not want the government to
do, regardless of the circumstances.
The same analysis dictates free speech protection for corporations, at
least as against certain types of restrictions. The Court has recognized that
"[o]ur whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds. 2 10 The First Amendment forbids
the government from commandeering people's thinking process in an effort
to modify their behavior. Rather, behavioral choices and the information
that guides those choices must remain free from governmental control or manipulation. 211 This prohibition on governmentally imposed thought control
gives rise to the fundamental precept that the government may not restrict
views or ideas merely because they are unpopular or deemed by the government to be unwise. The Court has stated that the "bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment ...

is that government may not prohibit the

expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
212
disagreeable.
In at least certain situations, governmental regulation of corporate
speech is premised on grounds wholly inconsistent with this fundamental notion. Such regulation often reflects governmental mistrust of citizens' ability
to make rational judgments on the basis of free and open debate. A classic
illustration is the government's attempt to ban tobacco advertising: the government seeks to deal with expression that advocates an activity the government deems unwise-although lawful-not by encouraging counterspeech
but rather by resorting to naked suppression because the government does
not trust individuals to make proper choices on the basis of free and open
209

See, e.g., Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 289 (1920) (al-

lowing a corporation to present a procedural due process challenge to the fixing of maximum
rates chargeable without an independent judicial determination).
210 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (recognizing a right to possess obscene
materials in the home).
211 See RlDIsH, supra note 86, at 47; Strauss, supra note 154, at 355-56; see also 44 Li-

quormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1515-16 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (stating that the First Amendment rejects any attempt to keep
people "ignorant in order to manipulate their choices").
212 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,414 (1989); see also Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-36 (1992) (striking down a law that allowed higher permit fees for
speech likely to arouse public hostility); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (placing the
burden on unwilling listeners to "avert[ ] their eyes" to avoid objectionable or offensive speech);

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[W]e should be
eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe .... ");
Stone, supra note 110, at 214-15 & n.98 (citing cases in arguing that the First Amendment does

not permit government to prohibit unpopular views).
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debate.2 13 Such governmental behavior is wholly inconsistent with First
Amendment dictates concerning the government. Because the principle that
the government may not suppress expression because of its mistrust of its
citizens focuses on the nature of the relationship between the government
and the private citizen, the speaker's nature is rendered wholly irrelevant.
Viewed from this perspective, much of the Court's rationale in Austin
takes on an Orwellian and counterproductive air. The Austin Court accepted
as a rationale for governmental restriction of corporate expression an argument that manifests this mistrust of citizens' ability to judge competing contributions to public debate that is anathema to basic First Amendment
principles. The Court took the unprecedented step of allowing the corporate
speech restriction in order to ensure that the amount of expression by the
corporation "reflect[s] actual public support for the political ideas espoused
by [the] corporation[ ].,a214 The Court, however, explained neither why protection of expression should be calibrated to reflect the actual degree of public support nor how, if such calibration were necessary, the idea's popularity
could be measured if the idea's expression were restricted beforehand. How,
one might reasonably ask, can an idea "get itself accepted in the competition
of the market" 215 if the state can restrict the idea at the source because of its
presumed lack of support? The Court thus laid the groundwork for an interpretation of the First Amendment that counterproductively and circularly
confined protection of expression on the basis of preexisting public support
for that expression. The Court also ignored the fact that the expression of
noncorporate, as well as corporate, interests could just as easily give rise to a
false sense of support due simply to the intensity of noncorporate beliefs,
even though the actual number of supporters is relatively small.
The Austin Court took the further puzzling step of labeling the presentation of ideas that, the Court assumed, lacked public support as "corruption, '216 the mere potential for which apparently was sufficient to justify
governmental suppression of corporate speech. 217 The Court's analysis, however, is fundamentally flawed. The assumption that awareness of unpopular
ideas or information inherently distorts or corrupts, rather than enhances,
people's ability both to self-realize and to make personal and electoral
choices is incompatible with basic notions of First Amendment theory. 218
213 See Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the FirstAmendment, 81 IowA L. REv.
589, 590-92 (1996).
214 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990); see also FEC v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986) ("The availability of these resources may make a corporation a formidable political presence, even though the power of the
corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas.").
215 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
216 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 659-60; see also MCFL, 479 U.S. at 257 (expressing concern over
the "corrosive influence of concentrated corporate wealth").
217 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 661; see also Paul S. Edwards, Defining PoliticalCorruption:The
Supreme Court's Role, 10 BYU . Pun. L. 1, 21 (1996) (arguing that the Austin Court's view of
corruption may be understood as reflecting a Rawlsian view of political equality according to
which corporations should not be permitted to control the course of public debate).
218 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 706 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (stating that insulating voters from
access to ideas is incompatible with the First Amendment); see also RDISH, supra note 86, at

19981

What's Good for GeneralMotors

Wholly apart from this departure from fundamental precepts of First
Amendment theory is the danger of abuse to which the Court's approach
gives rise. Under the Court's reasoning, as Justice Scalia argued in dissent,
"virtually anything [government] deems politically undesirable can be turned
into political corruption-by simply describing its effects as politically
'corrosive."' 219
In any event, were one to accept the Court's reasoning, one could not
logically confine its application to corporate speech. One could just as easily
reason that an individual's actual amount of advocacy should not be disproportionate to the level of actual public support that currently exists for his
position.220 Employing the Court's logic, then, an individual who possesses
unpopular political beliefs or who supports a fringe candidate could be restrained from financing expression beyond the existing level of support for
that candidate's message. The explanation for this new concept of corruption
might be, as Professor Powe has argued, that "[flt is easy to defend speech we
hate so long as it is ineffective, but it is much harder to do so when people
actually respond positively." 221
Professor Powe's comment underscores the importance of a second precept derived from the First Amendment's prohibition on thought control, a
precept that Professor Strauss labels the "persuasion principle. '222 This principle posits that the government may not suppress speech on the ground that
it is too persuasive. 22 3 This position is a version of the First Amendment's
"widely shared hostility to paternalism," 2 4 which demands that "the government may not suppress speech on the ground that the speech is likely to
persuade people to do something that the government considers harmful" or
of which the government disapproves. 2 To permit the government to do so,
113 (arguing that decreasing the flow of available information undermines

important First

Amendment values).

219 Austin, 494 U.S. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
220 See id.at 685 (Scalia, J.,dissenting); cf CAss R. SuNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 238 (1993) (arguing that some individual speech does not reflect

popular support).
221 L.A. Powe, Jr., Mass Speech and the Newer FirstAmendment, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 243,
283; see also id.
(illustrating that unpopular "mass speech" reaches a wider audience and thus is
potentially more effective than unpopular speech on a soapbox).
222 See Strauss, supra note 154, at 334.
223 See id.;
see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978) ("[T]he fact that
advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it ....").
224 David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures,and Paternalism,74 VA. L. REv. 519,519 (1988);

see also id. at 542-43 (discussing the Supreme Court's emphasis on the idea that the First Amendment "outlaws a paternalist[ic] approach to the messages a person may receive"); Stone, supra
note 110, at 212 ("The Court has long embraced an 'antipaternalistic' understanding of the first
amendment."). This anti-paternalism concept is clearest in the Court's commercial speech cases.

See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S.Ct. 1495, 1508 (1996) (rejecting a restriction
on liquor price advertising designed to "keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good"); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,

Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (searching for an "alternative to this highly paternalistic approach"
of banning advertisements). For a discussion of the paternalistic and antipaternalistic strains in
commercial speech, see Redish, supra note 213, at 611-12 (discussing commercial speech decisions upholding an antipaternalistic view of the First Amendment).
225 Strauss, supra note 154, at 335; see also REDISH, supra note 86, at 47 (arguing that be-
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as one of us has argued, would constitute a "dangerous manifestation of governmental mistrust of citizens' abilities to absorb and judge the expression of
competing viewpoints.

' 226

Arguments against protection of corporate speech generally ignore these
principles, relying instead on two basic paternalistic assumptions. The first
assumption is that massive amounts of corporate speech are likely to persuade listeners, regardless of the merits of the ideas presented. 227 The second
assumption is that listeners may become overloaded with more information
than they can process. Thus, the argument proceeds, unless the government
228
intervenes, listeners will be unable to make clear, rational decisions.
These assumptions ignore the premises of individual dignity and rationality inherent in both democratic theory in general and free speech theory in
particular.2 29 No matter how often or loudly one disseminates expression, as
Professor Shelledy has argued, "[i]f democracy is to have meaning, we must
generally assume that speech affects voting behavior only when it persuades." 230 Indeed, neither the First Amendment nor the democratic system
of which it is a part could function under any other premise.

III. The Case Against CorporateSpeech: A Response
A.

Corporate Speech and the Profit Motive: The Role of Self-Interest in
Free Speech Theory

This Article already described Professor Baker's liberty theory, pursuant
to which free speech applies only to the voluntarily chosen, self-developmental expression of individuals or associations, and the theory's implications for
corporate speech protection.23 1 In our view, such a narrow approach to the
values served by free expression improperly constricts the scope of the First
cause the government may not determine what life-affecting decisions an individual can make, it
cannot suppress the information on which those decisions are based); Stone, supra note 110, at
213 ("The point, rather, is that the government ordinarily may not restrict the expression of
particular ideas, viewpoints, or items of information because it does not trust its citizens to make
wise or desirable decisions ....
).
226 Redish, supra note 213, at 636.
227 See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990) (restricting
corporate speech because "the power of the corporation may be no reflection of the power of its
ideas" (citation omitted)); see also Frederick Schauer, The Political Incidence of the Free Speech
Principle,64 U. COLO. L. REV. 935, 949 (1993) (suggesting that "resources have more explanatory power than truth in determining which propositions a population will accept and which it
will reject"); Wright, supra note 162, at 638 (stating that government regulation is necessary "so
that the wealthiest voices may not dominate the debate by the strength of their dollars rather
than their ideas").
228 See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IowA L. REv. 1405, 1412 (1986)
(noting that opportunities for speech are "limited ... by our capacity to digest or process information"); Shelledy, supra note 6, at 575-76 (arguing that "selective reception of messages" limits
the amount of information that individuals can process, thus enabling the wealthy advocate's
views to exert greater influence).
229 See supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text.
230 Shelledy, supra note 6, at 574; see also Austin, 494 U.S. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that speech is effective only to the extent it strikes someone as true).
231 See supra notes 126-129 and accompanying text.
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Amendment.23 2 Even if one were to reject this unduly truncated perspective
of the liberty model, however, one might nevertheless oppose First Amendment protection for corporate speech simply on the grounds that narrow concerns of personal self-interest exclusively motivate such expression. The
distinction between these two rationales for rejecting First Amendment protection for corporate speech is significant. One could conceivably accept-as
the liberty model does not-that corporate expression is voluntarily chosen
yet nevertheless seek to exclude it from the First Amendment's scope because it does not constitute an unselfish attempt to further the broad public
interest.
Such opposition to self-interested speech is largely reflected in the theories of modern civic republican scholars who argue that "the motivating force
of political behavior should not be self-interest, narrowly defined. '23 3 Civic
republican scholars oppose purely "pluralist" activity that seeks selfishly and
234
exclusively to promote the individual's private interests.
Under well-accepted First Amendment doctrine, however, a speaker's
motivation is entirely irrelevant to the question of constitutional protection 3 5 It is true that motivation may be relevant in enabling the listener to
evaluate the context of certain expression, and the listener's evaluation may
well change based on the expression's motivation. 3 6 An individual is much
more inclined to be skeptical of arguments against a product's regulation asserted by a profit-motivated manufacturer than similar arguments asserted by
a completely objective observer. It does not follow, however, that self-interested speech is inherently valueless. Just as a lawyer representing a client can
make persuasive arguments or present information important to an objective
observer despite the presence of an obvious self-interest, a self-interested advocate also can make valuable contributions to public debate. In addition,
there is nothing necessarily immoral or illegitimate in using expression to
further one's personal interests. Any theory of free expression that selectively reduces protection of self-interested expression is inconsistent with the
historical and philosophical traditions of democracy, for these traditions recognize the centrality of an individual's right to contribute to the betterment
7
of her personal welfare .3
In any event, the realities are that many fully protected speakers stand to
gain financially or personally if listeners accept their speech. Some examples
include political candidates seeking elective office, consumer organizations
seeking increased consumer protection, welfare recipients seeking increases
232 See supra notes 130-135 and accompanying text.
233 Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the RepublicanRevival, 97 YALE L.L 1539, 1550 (1988) ("[I]n
their capacity as political actors, citizens and representatives are not supposed to ask only what is
in their private interest .....
234 See id. at 1564-65.
235 See, e.g., Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988) (arguing that, although

relevant for tort liability, motive is irrelevant for First Amendment purposes).
236

See Redish, supra note 164, at 1456-57; supra notes 163-163 and accompanying text; see

also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 684 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting that corporate advocacy's effectiveness is impacted by considering the "invariably selfinterested and probably uncongenial source").
237 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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in benefits, farmers seeking subsidies, and American auto workers seeking

higher tariffs on foreign automobiles. Indeed, the incentives produced by
self-interest are likely to significantly enrich public debate's substance. These
incentives are likely to spur expression's thoroughness, thoughtfulness, and
breadth of distribution. To exclude all self-interested expression from the

scope of the constitutional guarantee, then, would effectively gut free speech
protection.
Outside of the expressive context, our legal system has long recognized
that the existence of personal interest may enrich contributions to society
made by private individuals and entities. The most concrete example of such

recognition is the standing requirement for jurisdiction in Article III federal
courts. Self-interest is a constitutional requirement. One of the essential elements of constitutional standing is that a plaintiff have "such a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of federal-

court jurisdiction,"23 8 or that a plaintiff "show that he personally has suffered
some actual or threatened injury." 239 The concern behind this standing requirement is, at least in part, the need for an individual advocate with a suffi-

cient personal stake or concern to effectively litigate the matter by providing
determined adverse parties and the ability to sharpen the disagreement and
illustrate the key issues. 240
As with a plaintiff in a legal action, a speaker who is likely to gain or lose

financially if some policy is implemented or a particular candidate is elected
to public office possesses a strong incentive to devote the time, resources, and
effort to creating and disseminating a particular message and to effectively

advocating his position.24 1 From the listener's standpoint, such self-interest
may sharpen the disagreements among the several voices and illustrate the

issues and positions on which the individual listener, like a court, ultimately
must make decisions.
To use Austin as an example, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce advocated Richard Bandstra's election quite probably because the organization

and its members believed they would gain financially from his election. This,
of course, is not to say that financial interest provides a greater incentive to
238 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) ("A plaintiff must allege personal injury .... "). Other
constitutional requirements are that the injury be "fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly
unlawful conduct" and that judicial relief likely will redress the injury. See id. at 751.
239 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted).
240 See ERWiN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDIcriON 56 (2d ed. 1994); see also Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (requiring "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions"). Compare Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudenceof Article 111: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy"
Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REv. 297, 309 (1979) (expressing concern for existence of the "ideological plaintiff"), with Mark V. Thshnet, The Sociology of Article III: A Response to Professor
Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1698, 1708-09 (1980) (suggesting a rule that grants standing to
those who are part of an "institution with a continuing concern for the relevant substantive
law"). Note, however, that even under Dean Tushnet's more relaxed standing rule, some personal interest for some issue or area of the law remains necessary.
241 See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 782 n.18 (1978).
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speak on political and social issues than would purely ideological interest;
MCFL presumably has the same level of incentive to speak in support of prolife candidates as the Chamber of Commerce has to speak in support of probusiness candidates. But that is the point: both have similarly strong incentives. Speech should not lose its protection merely because the incentive is
financial rather than ideological.
B. Shareholder Protectionand the Preclusion of Forced Speech
A common argument made against the protection of corporate speech is
that individual shareholders might oppose the message that the corporation
disseminates; therefore, the argument contends, the government has a legitimate interest in protecting those shareholders from being forced to subsidize
the expression of positions with which they disagree. 242 Normally, corporate
shareholders do not have the power to veto individual decisions made by
management. 243 A dissenting shareholder, for example, has no authority to
halt management's decision to leave or enter a particular geographical market or to begin a new product line. At first blush, it might appear puzzling
that the only corporate decision over which the state allows a dissenting
shareholder to exercise a veto power is one concerning expression. As a
prima facie matter, such gratuitous and selective inhibition on expressive activity would seem to contravene explicit Supreme Court statements rendering
such actions invalid. 244 What at first appears to be a selective inhibition on
expression, however, has been defended as a means to prevent the unique
problem of compelled speech, which often has been characterized as a First
Amendment violation, at least when the government compels the speech. 245
As Professor Brudney has argued, "government concerned with protecting
First Amendment values could reasonably believe it important to free those
'246
citizens from bondage to management's political views.
Closer examination reveals, however, that for several reasons, the forced
speech rationale cannot justify excluding corporate speech from the First
Amendment's scope. First, a parallel standard is not followed when it comes
to associations other than profitmaking corporations even though a similar
242 See DAN-CoI-N, supra note 14, at 108-09 (discussing the argument that shareholders
are forced to contribute to the expression of views they do not hold); Brudney, supra note 6, at
247 ("A's right to receive information does not require the state to permit B to steal from C the

funds that alone will enable B to make the communication."); see also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 675 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("State surely has a compelling interest in preventing a corporation it has chartered from exploiting those who do not

wish to contribute to the [corporation's] political message."); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 812 (White, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the overriding governmental interest in "assuring that shareholders are

not compelled to support and financially further beliefs with which they disagree").
243

See infra note 273 and accompanying text.

244

See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.

105, 120 (1991) (rejecting selective application of state's compelling interest); infra notes 275-275

and accompanying text.
245 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
246 Brudney, supra note 6, at 238; see also Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 814 (White, J., dissenting)
("States have always been free to adopt measures designed to further rights protected by the

Constitution even when not compelled to do so."); id. at 813-14 (discussing cases protecting
individuals from forced speech).
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problem could arise. Second, it is by no means obvious that shareholders
automatically will be so identified with the corporations' expressed positions
that the shareholders realistically can be deemed to have been forced to
speak. Third, even assuming one can make such an identification, the relative cost of exit is not so high as to lead to the conclusion that the shareholder's expression actually has been forced. The following section will
explore each of these points in greater detail.
1. Protecting Shareholders:Attempting to DistinguishAmong Types of
Associations
The theory underlying the "shareholder forced speech" argument is that
because shareholders should not have their money used to promote messages
with which they disagree,247 a stockholder's money in the corporation's general treasury should not be used to support expression advocating a particular candidate or policy position.248 This concern for dissenting members,
however, never has been extended to nonprofit corporations, as the Court's
decision in MCFL shows2 49 The Court there expressly recognized that contributors to a nonprofit corporation "are fully aware of its political purposes,
and in fact contribute precisely because they support those purposes."250 The
Court reasoned that some entities, although assuming the corporate form,
have "features more akin to voluntary political associations than business
firms."25 1 This argument turns entirely on a distinction between ordinary
business and so-called ideological corporations in order to grant the latter
type of organization greater free speech rights.252 Such "advocacy" corporations are supposedly marked by a unanimity of positions among members
53
and a desire to express common views.2
Supporters of this position are unclear, however, as to the specific matters on which unanimity must lie in order for this rationale to apply: ultimate
goals, specific strategies, specific statements, or a combination of the three.
To illustrate the point, consider MCFL, an organization whose members
share a commitment to fostering respect for human life and defending the
See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 670 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 812 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing for protecting shareholders
if the issue does not materially affect business of the corporation).
247
248

249

See FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 260-61 (1986); see also

supra notes 58-58 and accompanying text.
250 MCFL, 479 U.S. at 260-61.
251 Id. at 263.
252 See id. at 263-64 (describihg three features of such political organizations); see also
BAKER, supra note 13, at 220 (arguing that modem corporations are not oriented towards "associative value goals"); Bezanson, supra note 13, at 778-81 (distinguishing types of organizations
based on the degree of connection between its members and the corporate statements); Brudney, supra note 149, at 74 (distinguishing business corporations from other voluntary associations); Dan-Cohen, supra note 149, at 1248 (distinguishing the type of speech rights held by
business corporations as opposed to other organizations).
253 See O'Kelley, supra note 6, at 1365-66 (describing the "associational rationale" for protecting some corporate speech); see also Brudney, supra note 149, at 75 (describing individuals
who join organizations in order to support their advocacy activities).
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right to life of all human beings born and unborn 254 Suppose the organization decides to advocate the blockading of abortion clinics as a means of
stopping abortions. Suppose further that several members of the organization object to those statements and tactics. Has unanimity-or indeed, even
commonality of interests-been lost? At some specific level, the answer has
to be yes even though members likely continue to agree on the association's
general pro-life policies. In such a scenario, either the MCFL Court's distinction no longer justifies protecting MCFL's expression or the distinction itself
has been undermined. The latter conclusion is more reasonable. Just as
members of an ideological association still agree on ultimate goals despite
possible differences on specific strategies, so, too, do the shareholders of
commercial corporations share the universal corporate goal of profit maximization even though they may disagree as to the best method to attain that
result.25 5
Even at the most general level of ultimate goals, the MCFL Court's distinction fails because, as Professor Smolla has correctly argued, "Americans
who contribute to the ACLU are not likely to agree with every position in its
platform, any more than the investor in General Motors agrees with all of its
corporate positions. '256 The point may be illustrated by examining the actions and responses of organizations to the issue of First Amendment protection for hate speech. 25 7 Numerous advocacy organizations, expressly formed
for the protection of First Amendment rights and whose members presumably joined for that purpose, came out in support of hate speech restriction
while opposing other, similar speech restrictions. 25 8 Such inconsistencies, of
course, are not in and of themselves problematic. What is problematic, however, is the view that First Amendment protection for the organization's
speech should turn solely on a perceived absence of such inconsistencies. If
such a standard were to be employed, the consistent protection of the speech
of ideologically based associations would be at least as problematic as protecting the speech of profit-maximizing corporations. Indeed, General Mo254 See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 241-42 (explaining the corporate purpose).
255 Cf Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130, 2135 & n.3 (1997) (providing an example that fruit growers share the same basic aim as government-controlled adver-

tising campaign-namely, increasing sales-even though they might differ over specific
strategies as to how to accomplish that goal).
256 SMOLLA, supra note 164, at 239; see also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652, 687 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Would it be any more upsetting to a shareholder of

General Motors that it endorsed the election of Henry Wallace (to stay comfortably in the past)
than it would be to a member of the [ACLU] that it endorsed the election of George Wallace?").
But see Dan-Cohen, supra note 149, at 1249 (arguing that members maintain affiliation with
expressive organizations precisely because of the communicative activity and despite potential
disparity between the organization's views and the individual's views on some issues).
257 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,391 (1992) (striking down an ordinance

banning racially motivated hate speech).
258 See, e.g., EDWARD J. CLEARY,BEYOND THE BURNING CRoss: THm FIRST AMENDMENT
AND THm LANDMARK R.A.V. CASE 96 (1994) (describing People for the American Way's positions supporting the hate speech ordinance but opposing efforts to ban violent rap songs); see
also icL at 199-200 (discussing the positions of the ACLU, which had defended the Nazis' right to
march in Skokie, Illinois: lukewarm opposition to the hate speech ordinance and support for
sentence enhancement for racially motivated crimes).
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tors is more likely to achieve general unanimity, because pursuing the
ultimate goal of turning a profit is not only shared but actually required on
threat of a shareholder suit.
One possible reason for distinguishing between profitmaking and nonprofit, ideologically based associations turns on the difference between the
incentives that are assumed to stimulate someone to join or support the two
types of organizations. Many assume that the incentive for joining an ideologically based association is more effective advocacy while the incentive for
investing in a profitmaking corporation is the maximization of profits. This
argument, however, ignores the fact that advocacy rarely is exclusively an
end in itself but rather is a means to an end-political, ideological, personal
or economic. Individuals presumably did not join MCFL merely to speak
about abortion and right-to-life issues; instead, they joined in order to
achieve a goal, namely the alteration of existing government policies on
right-to-life issues. They seek to achieve this result through a variety of activities, including speech. Similarly, individuals invest in General Motors in order to turn a profit as part of a socially and politically powerful entity
through a variety of activities, including speech. 259 In each case, joining and
speaking through an organization enhances one's ability to achieve certain
ends through the vehicles of strong collective action and speech. Thus, the
only difference between MCFL and General Motors lies in the two corporations' goals. Advocacy toward each organization's particular goal serves the
same role for each organization and provides the same incentive for members
to join.
2.

Questioning the Cost of Exit

Yet another arguable basis of distinction between the two organizational
types concerns the costs that dissenting members must incur in order to disassociate themselves from their respective organizations. Shareholders in
profitmaking corporations will have to sell their shares, while members of an
ideological organization will be required merely to resign their membership.
Thus, one might argue that shareholders will suffer more harmful consequences from such disassociation and, therefore, will have a disincentive to
do so. 260 The argument, in essence, is that investors in a business corporation
should not be "forced to choose between contributing to political or social
expressions with which they disagree or foregoing opportunities for profitable investment."'261 Such a profit-oriented choice arguably is not at issue with
an ideological or political corporation. Whether such reasoning justifies the
view of the dissenting shareholder as a compelled speaker, however, is
questionable.
259 See Friedman & Goldston, supra note 144, at 44; see also supra 131-150 and accompanying text.
260 See Brudney, supra note 149, at 58-60 (discussing the need to protect individual
shareholders).
261 Brudney, supra note 6, at 268; see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 818
(1978) (White, J., dissenting) (noting a state interest in ensuring that "citizens are not forced to
choose between supporting the propagation of views with which they disagree and passing up
investment opportunities").
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This argument is derived from cases involving labor unions' expression
in which the Court has held that mandatory union dues should not be used
for political purposes, because to do so would force union-dues payers to
fund messages with which they might disagree.262 The union cases are distinguishable, however, on several key points. Initially, these cases all arose
under situations in which the law permitted an agency shop arrangement.
According to this arrangement, all employees either had to be members of
the union or at least had to pay dues as an employment condition.263 In these
cases, individuals actually depended upon the organization for a job, income,
2 64
and livelihood, thus rendering the option of exit unrealistic
The same cannot be said, however, of investment in a profitmaking corporation. At worst, the financial sacrifice that would follow from exiting a
business corporation is impossible to determine, ex ante. Because shares of
stock are presumably traded in efficient securities markets in which the stock
and current market price likely are fungible, the shareholder probably will
lose nothing in the transaction.265 To the extent that the corporate speech
somehow causes the stock's price to fall, the shareholder has other remedies,
such as a shareholder suit for breach of fiduciary duty, as a means of obtaining redress. 266 The difference between labor unions and corporations,
then, amounts to the difference between state-compelled membership as a
prerequisite to earning a living and voluntary investment. 267 Because an investor dissatisfied with a corporation's speech generally may simply reinvest
in another corporation, the element of forced speech in the union and corporate contexts is significantly different. 268 For purposes of determining the va262 See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977) (requiring that

expenditures for political expression be financed from dues "paid by employees who do not
object to advancing those ideas"); Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 414-15
(1972) (holding that political funds must be separate from union dues and must indicate their
political purpose); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 768-69 (1961) (denying unions, "over an employee's objection, the power to use his exacted funds to support political causes which he opposes").
263 See Abood, 431 U.S. at 212 (requiring union-shop and "service charge" by nonmembers); Street, 367 U.S. at 746-47 (providing an example of federal law permitting union-shop

agreements).
264 See FECv. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,260 (1986) (distinguishing
union cases from corporations); Cohen, supra note 111, at 33 ("Individuals are increasingly dependent upon memberships and participation in organizations such as labor unions ... to practice their trades ....
).
265 See BtrrI~n & RBsTa iN, supra note 111, at 65; see also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of

Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 687 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that selling stock "does not
ordinarily involve the severe psychic trauma or economic disaster that Justice Brennan's opinion

suggests").
266 See BtrrtR & Rmsmu, supra note 111, at 65-66; see also Austin, 494 U.S. at 691

(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("General Motors, after all, will risk a stockholder suit if it makes a political endorsement that is not plausibly tied to its ability to make money for its shareholders.").
267 See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794-95 n.34 (1978); cf. Austin, 494 U.S. at
710 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that "[o]ne need not become a member of the Michigan
Chamber of Commerce or the Sierra Club in order to earn a living").

268 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 709-10 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Brudney, supra note 6, at 270
("IT]he freedom to refrain from working is not equally as exercisable as the freedom to refrain

from investing ....

).
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lidity of governmental regulation of corporate speech, having to forego a
particular investment opportunity-at least as an a priori matter-simply is
269
not of the same magnitude as the obligation to find new employment.
In any event, to the extent that one accepts the "compelled speech" rationale, it would be logically difficult to confine the rationale to the corporate

context. Professor Dan-Cohen has demonstrated persuasively why the argument from economic choices cannot logically be so limited.2 70 He posits a
hypothetical in which a wealthy businessman who is a known fascist pays
high interest on money he borrows from local individuals but uses the money
to disseminate his unpopular political messages.2 71 This scenario introduces

ideological and political concerns into all business decisions; a potential
lender is forced to choose between foregoing a profitable use of her money
or contributing to a political message with which she disagrees. These are the

exact choices that form the basis of this dissenting shareholder argument
against corporate speech, yet no one would suggest that the government
could prevent the businessman from disseminating his message.2 72 It is sim-

ply impossible to know, a priori, whether selling shares will harm, benefit, or
have little economic effect on the shareholder. Therefore, it is impossible to

draw such a distinction.
3.

Gratuitous Inhibitions on Speech

An additional difficulty with the dissenting-shareholder argument is that
dissenters' preferences are ignored freely in nonspeech contexts of corporate
decisionmaking. This is true even of the dissenters' ideological preferences.
One could imagine numerous examples of corporations' nonexpressive actions-such as investing in an apartheid-dominated South Africa, operating
an abortion clinic, or employing low-wage foreign labor-that some shareholders might find politically or ideologically objectionable. Yet under governing corporation law, those dissenters would be largely powerless to stop
such actions. 273 The use of corporate assets to support political causes that
might be inconsistent with some shareholders' interests does not appear to
differ significantly from any other type of management misbehavior. 274
269 But see Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 818 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that employees in the
union cases were free to seek other employment); Brudney, supra note 6, at 270 (arguing that
the "freedom of investors to go elsewhere would be costly, if not wholly illusory").
270 See DAN-COHEN, supra note 14, at 108-09.
271

See id. at 109.

272 Obviously an individual is free to reach a private agreement with the businessman stating that the businessman not use the loan for his fascist speech. Likewise, one can employ private shareholder agreements to restrict the corporation's speech. Neither implicates the First
Amendment because the government does not compel the restriction. See BUTLER & RBSTEIN,
supra note 111, at 65 (arguing that such private contracts restricting corporate speech "do not
raise significant First Amendment concerns").
273 Cf. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 686-87 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("[M]anagement may take any action that is ultimately in accord with what the majority... of the shareholders wishes, so long as that action is designed to make a profit."); cf.
Fred D. Baldwin, Conflicting Interests 3-4 (1984) (discussing corporate governance reform and
the controversy surrounding the "proper relation between private business interests and other
social concerns").
274 See BUTLER & RMSTEIN, supra note 111, at 59-60.
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Targeting corporate speech as the sole method of protecting dissenting
shareholders violates the principle wisely recognized by the Court in Simon
& Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board.275
There the Court struck down a statute that served a state interest by burden276
ing income derived by convicted criminals only from expressive activity.
The stronger version of this doctrine, suggested by Justice Kennedy in a separate opinion in the case, would invalidate, without further inquiry, any burdensome restriction that singles out protected speech.2 77 Under this
reasoning, the government cannot achieve even compelling interests by restricting only speech when nonspeech activity gives rise to similar dangers.
Thus, even assuming that there is a compelling state interest in protecting
dissenting shareholders, 278 the government cannot serve that interest by burdening speech but leaving uncontrolled nonexpressive conduct that continues
to give rise to that very same concern.2 79
One could conceivably argue that expression does, in fact, present a
unique danger in this context because of the state's legitimate interest in
preventing compelled speech on the shareholders' part. The Court has held
that such compulsion, when imposed by the government, violates the First
Amendment. 28 0 The state, one might argue, properly may choose to prevent
private entities from compelling their members' speech. By restricting corporate speech, the argument goes, the state is providing extra protection to
these rights as investors in commercial corporations exercise them.28 1
At the very most, recognizing such a First Amendment-like interest on
the shareholders' part results in a stand-off between dueling First Amendment rights. On the one hand are the free speech interests of corporate managers and majority shareholders who seek to utilize the corporate form's
efficiencies for expressive purposes and of listeners who would benefit from
the speech. On the other hand are the First Amendment interests of the
dissenting shareholders who would be forced to subsidize the speech against
their wil.
Careful analysis reveals, however, that no such stand-off exists.
275 502 U.S. 105 (1991). The Court invalidated New York's "Son of Sam" law, which required anyone convicted of a crime to surrender to the state, and then to the victim or victim's

family, any income earned from books relating to the crime. See id. at 123.
276 See id.at 116 (classifying law as "content-based").
277 See id. at 124 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). The weaker version, from the

majority opinion, is that such a direct burden is subject to strict scrutiny, requiring a compelling
state interest and narrow tailoring of the law. See id. at 120-21. The majority opinion recognized
a compelling state interest in compensating crime victims but held that the statute was not narrowly tailored as required by strict scrutiny. See id. at 120-23.

278 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 675 (Brennan, J., concurring); First Nat'I Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 812 (1978) (White, J., dissenting); see also Brudney, supra note 6, at 256-57 (discussing
how political science and economic theory justify state interest as compelling).
279 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794-95 n.34 (stating that no one has explained "why the dissenting shareholder's wishes are entitled to such greater solicitude in this context than in many
others where equally important and controversial corporate decisions are made").
280 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.

281 See supra notes 245-246 and accompanying text.
282 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 676-77 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Neuborne, supra note
160, at 31 (noting that there is no metric to determine who wins when the interests of speaker
and listener diverge).
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Initially, it is by no means clear that individual shareholders are widely
identified with the positions taken in particular corporate expression. 28 3 This
is especially so in light of the explicit legal dichotomy that traditionally has
been drawn between corporate structure and individual shareholders. 284 In
addition, such a choice exists in nonspeech contexts as well: potential investors must choose between foregoing a profitable investment or subsidizing
nonexpressive business conduct they might find disagreeable, such as using
low-paid labor in foreign countries or operating an abortion clinic. Singling
out speech for negative treatment, one should recall, violates the principle of
28 5
the Court's decision in Simon & Schuster.
In any event, from a certain perspective, profitmaking corporations' expression represents the shareholders' common view, at least when that concept is defined broadly. 28 6 Perhaps there exists disagreement as to the wisest
strategies to accomplish the corporate goal, but the basic goal itself is held in
common: the desire to maximize profits through the company's activities.
Because a business corporation risks a shareholder suit if it expends corporate funds on any speech not plausibly tied to its profit maximization goal,
any political speech must support a candidate or position that, if adopted, will
inure, in one way or another, to the corporation's financial benefit. In an
important sense, then, such speech does reflect the shareholders' ultimate,
common, and unanimously shared desire to enhance profits.
4. Seeking Less Invasive Means to Protect Shareholders
Assume, for purposes of argument, that some connection exists between
shareholders and the corporation's speech and that the law therefore should
recognize some governmental interest in protecting dissenting shareholders.
The problem with the corporate speech prohibition is that such a remedy
completely silences the majority of the shareholders who agree with the
statement or position that the corporation wishes to express. 28 7 The remedy
would prevent the majority or supermajority of shareholders, which ultimately determines a corporation's actions, from advocating political positions
the shareholders wish to take through the corporate form. Moreover, completely excluding corporate speech from the First Amendment's scope actually would authorize the government to prohibit corporate messages, even
when shareholders unanimously authorized the expenditure for that expression.28 8 This argument thus reaches the absurd conclusion that a nonexistent
283 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 42 ("The doctrine that a corporation is a constitutional person meant that the corporation's directors or managers had the power to assert the
corporation's constitutional claims. The far less cited corollary was that the shareholders lacked
standing to assert these rights.").
284 See generally STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL' 1.01 (1991) (dis-

cussing the distinction between the corporate entity and individual shareholders for purposes of

liability).
285 See supra notes 275-279 and accompanying text.
286 The Court, in fact, recently has construed broadly the "common view" concept. See
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130, 2139-40 (1997).
287 See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794-95 n.34 (1978) (expressing concern
that the majority will be completely silenced because a "hypothetical minority might object").
288 See id. at 794.
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dissenting minority can restrict speech supported even by every investor in
the corporation.
The Court sought to circumvent this problem in the union cases by, instead of categorically prohibiting union expenditures, merely requiring the
unions to refund a percentage of the dues of a member who disagreed with
specified speech expenditures.28 9 Therefore, the union was allowed to speak
in its own voice but without drawing on funds from any members who disagreed with the message being expressed. One scholar has suggested that
this solution could work just as effectively in the corporate context.290 Arguably, the segregated fund scheme recognized in MCFL and Austin-in
which only those shareholders who support the speech are required to pay
for it through donations to a separate fund-constituted a similar attempt to
protect the dissenters while still permitting those who support a message to
291
have their say.
The problem with the segregated fund scheme is that when the dust settles, the corporation still does not have the right to speak. In effect, the
scheme allows individuals to do exactly what they could have done even if
the corporation had never existed. Unlike the union cases, in which the
union itself still could present its own message when employing the refund
procedure, the speech from the separate corporate fund is not that of the
corporation because the corporation cannot put its money or its name toward
its own political speech.292 Rather, the speech is that of some subgroup of
293
individuals, resulting in the corporate message's diffusion.
Perhaps the greatest problem with the segregated fund concept is that it
effectively undermines the beneficial efficiency values sought to be derived
from the corporate form's use, solely in the expression context. Laws establishing the structure of corporate decisionmaking are designed to enable the
corporation to function with the greatest degree of economic efficiency possiSee Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 240 (1977).
See Brudney, supra note 6, at 271 (discussing "least restrictive means" of furthering
compelling state interest). But see Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 818 (White, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that
such a refund system is unworkable for corporations and does not solve the problem of investors
who are deterred from investing).
291 See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (holding that
the law is narrowly tailored because it eliminates distortion of wealth while allowing corporate
views to be expressed); id.
at 669 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (noting that the law is not an "acrossthe-board prohibition on political participation by corporations"); see also SuNsTEiN, supra note
220, at 238 (distinguishing the "mere segregation requirement" of Austin from the "flat ban" of
Bellotti); Brudney, supra note 6, at 272 (suggesting a segregated fund as an acceptable alternative); Shelledy, supra note 6, at 577 (arguing in favor of restrictions that "leave some outlet for
corporate points of view," as did the segregated fund in Austin).
292 See SMOLLA, supra note 164, at 236-37; see also Austin, 494 U.S. at 681 n.* (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("Just as political speech by [John D. Rockefeller's] association is not speech by John
D. Rockefeller, so also speech by a corporate PAC... is not speech by the corporation itself.");
289
290

BUTLER

& RiBsTEiN, supra note 111, at 63-64 ("[P]olitical speech by managers of publicly held

firms can generally be considered the expression of the individual managers from whom the
speech originates ....).
293 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 709 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); see also DAN-CoHEN, supra note
14, at 108 (arguing that individuals cannot produce speech that is "'irreducibly 'corporate' in
nature").

The George Washington Law Review

[Vol 66:235

ble.2 94 By requiring corporations to employ the cumbersome and inefficient
method of the segregated fund for expression purposes, the approach would
revoke those efficiency benefits only for expression purposes. The result
quite likely would be a dramatic reduction in the effectiveness of the contributions made to public debate.
Professor Brudney has suggested two additional ways in which dissenting shareholders may be protected. One is to restrict all wasteful corporate
spending, defined as "expenditures from which the enterprise cannot reasonably be expected to benefit," including "speech not reasonably related to the
corporation's business. 2 95 The second way is to structure the corporate decisionmaking process so as to require unanimous stockholder consent for all
corporate expenditures.2 96 Professor Brudney then considers whether either
restriction could be placed on only corporate speech or all corporate activities, and he concludes that the "First Amendment should not present an insurmountable obstacle to such a regulation," whether applied to all corporate
activities (including speech) or solely to corporate political speech. 297
If framed as speech-only regulations-prohibiting wasteful corporate
speech or requiring shareholder unanimity for speech-this suggestion would
be unconstitutional under Simon & Schuster. In such a situation, the government would be attempting to serve the general interest in protecting shareholders by burdening only corporate speech and leaving untouched
2 98
nonexpressive corporate conduct that implicates the same concern.
On the other hand, laws prohibiting waste in all corporate activities or
requiring shareholder consent for all activities likely would survive First
Amendment attack under the doctrine of United States v. O'Brien,2 99 which
established a lower level of scrutiny for generally applicable laws only inci294

According to Hurst,

Corporation law early favored business arrangements which centralized decision
making, gave it considerable assurance of tenure, and armed it for vigorous maneuver. Shareholder decisions, it was soon established, should normally be by simple
majority. Active management should be concentrated in a board of directors;
stockholders did not have owners' rights over the particular assets of a going corporate enterprise; unless exhibiting gross abuse of power or breach of faith, directors'
decisions governed the regular course of the business. [Furthermore, corporate
law] favored strong central direction of pooled assets; capacity for indefinite life,
uninterrupted by change of shareholders .... A board of directors must do its
business as a body, not as individuals.
HURST, supra note 101, at 25.
295 Brudney, supra note 6, at 243-44; see also O'Kelley, supra note 6, at 1362 (arguing that
the corporation must assert its rights "in connection with a form of expression that is a part of
the corporation's business").
296 See Brudney, supra note 6, at 254; see also BALDWIN, supranote 273, at 112 (discussing a
different suggestion for a unanimity requirement). Note, of course, that this would virtually halt
all corporate operations because any individual or group could purchase a veto in the form of
one share of stock. See id. at 112; Brudney, supra note 6, at 272 (noting that a unanimous shareholder requirement for corporate political speech "would effectively prohibit political speech by
the corporation").
297 Brudney, supra note 6, at 254.
298 See supra notes 275-279 and accompanying text.
299 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding law prohibiting burning of draft cards).
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dentally burdening speech.300 Assuming one accepts O'Brien,301 Professor
Brudney's proposed laws aimed at all corporate waste or requiring shareholder consent across the board should satisfy that standard because any impact on speech would be incidental to a general law designed to serve a
governmental purpose. Thus, there would be no gratuitous inhibition aimed
at speech alone.
One could imagine, then, a constitutionally valid statute prohibiting '3all
02
corporate activities "not reasonably related to the corporation's business.
This is not to suggest that the Bellotti Court was incorrect in striking down
30 3
the state law that imposed a "materially affecting" speech restriction.
Rather, this recognizes an alternative ground on which the Court could have
struck down the statute: it singled out speech from all other corporate activity
34

for its ban.
Pursuant to this analysis, assuming one accepts the state's asserted interest in protecting dissenting shareholders, one conceivably could modify the
statute inBellotti in order to simultaneously avoid unconstitutional interference with corporate speech and protect shareholders. The suggested law
would prohibit all wasteful corporate activity, of which speech is merely one
example. Thus, the distinction, for constitutional purposes, becomes one between an outright ban on all expression and a requirement that corporate
managers simply use their best judgment in making all decisions involving the
corporate funds' use, including decisions as to which messages the managers
will disseminate.
C.

The Equality Principle in Free Speech Theory: The Corporationas

Power Surrogate
Another argument used to rationalize the exclusion of corporate speech
from the First Amendment's scope is that because corporations have vast
resources that enable them to disseminate a message more effectively and
300 See id.at 376-77. The Court reasoned that

[G]overnment regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 377. Professor Stone refers to this as a "no gratuitous inhibition approach." Stone, supra
note 110, at 190-91 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
301 But see RaDISH, supra note 86, at 100-01 (describing O'Brien as the "most troubling
illustration of the Court's modern approach to content-neutral restrictions"). The Court has
continued to employ the O'Brien test. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 117 S.Ct. 1174,
1183 (1997) (upholding "must-carry provisions" under the intermediate scrutiny standard announced in O'Brien);Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566-68 (1991) (plurality opinion) (holding a public indecency statute valid under O'Brien, "despite its incidental limitations
on some expressive activity"); id. at 582 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with
the plurality opinion's use of the O'Brien test to determine the required degree of First Amendment protection).
302 Brudney, supra note 6, at 244.
303 See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,768 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id.at 785 (rejecting legislature's requirement that corporation "stick to business").
304 See supra notes 275-279 and accompanying text.
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broadly than other speakers, the corporate message will unduly dominate the

market, thereby "drowning out" competing expression as a practical matter.30 5 The government, therefore, may restrict corporate speech in order to
ensure that the public hears all competing expression equally.30 6 This con-

cept has been described as "proportional leveling" or "enhancement."307According to this argument, unequal expenditures for expression by
candidates and by advocates in the public debate, including corporations, create an artificial barrier to the exercise of what the Court has described in a
separate context as the "inalienable right to full and effective participation in

the political process[

].,,30s

Judge J. Skelly Wright, for example, argued that

acceptance of the ideals of "one person, one vote" and that "all men are

created equal" necessarily implies that equality is part of the First Amendment's central meaning.30 9 Professor Sunstein suggested that the concept of
political equality dictates that "all individuals and groups have access to the
political process; large disparities in political influence are disfavored." 310

Although it is certainly accurate to describe equality as an important
element of free speech theory, this rationale for the exclusion of corporate
speech is seriously flawed in a number of respects. Most important, it significantly misstates both the scope and rationale of the First Amendment's
equality principle. Moreover, even if one assumed that the rationale repre-

sented a legitimate application of the equality principle, its limitation to corporate speech artificially truncates the principle's reach and thus indefensibly

confines its application in an irrationally underinclusive manner.
1.

Misinterpreting the Concept of FirstAmendment Equality

The equality principle has a long and venerable tradition in First

Amendment theory and doctrine.311 When properly confined, the principle
not only makes perfect sense but is actually essential to free speech theory's

effective operation. The problem with the principle's use as a rationale for
excluding corporate speech from the First Amendment's scope, however, is
that such a use substantially misperceives the correct meaning and implica-

tions of the equality principle's proper role.
305 See Dan-Cohen, supra note 149, at 1245-46 (criticizing the Bellotti Court for rejecting
the concern that "corporate wealth and power may be used to 'drown out other points of view"'
(citation omitted)); Shelledy, supra note 6, at 575 ("[W]ealth gives some advocates exposure to
more voters and thereby gives them an opportunity to persuade a larger part of the electorate ... as a result of selective reception of messages .... "); Wright, supra note 162, at 637
("Unchecked political expenditures ... may drown opposing beliefs ....
).
306 See Wright, supra note 162, at 637 ("Limiting the amount that wealthy interests may
spend to publicize their views enhances the self-expression of individual citizens ... furthering
the values of freedom of speech.").
307 SMOLLA, supra note 164, at 237 ("proportional leveling"); Powe, supra note 221, at 267
("enhancement").
308 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964) (discussing the Equal Protection Clause's
dictate of "one person, one vote").
309 See Wright, supra note 162, at 610, 642.
310 Sunstein, supra note 233, at 1552.
311 See Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a CentralPrinciplein the FirstAmendment, 43 U. CFH.
L. REv. 20, 20-23 (1975); see also Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (articulating the
equality principle).
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To understand the misreading of First Amendment equality that underlies this argument for corporate speech's exclusion from the provision's guarantee, it is necessary to conceptualize equality on two levels: what we call
"first order" and "second order" equality. "First-order" equality, in the free
speech context, is premised on the precept that "[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. '312 All viewpoints must have an
equal opportunity to compete in the intellectual marketplace, free from selective governmental regulation, if the concept of free speech is not to be
rendered totally meaningless. If the government is permitted to suppress the
expression of a particular viewpoint that the government deems wrong or
offensive, there is no logical means of confining that power only to the suppression of certain positions. The only question would be which ideological
viewpoint is held by those in power at the time.313 Thus, properly understood, the equality principle dictates that the government must treat differing
viewpoints' expression in an equal manner.
To be contrasted with this first-order, speech-specific form of equality is
"second-order" equality, which focuses on the need for an equality of resources among speakers at the pre-expression stage. Second-order equality is
concerned not with the assurance of equal access of competing substantive
viewpoints but rather with equality of the speakers' pre-speech economic resources. Not only is a concern with second-order equality not dictated by
free expression values, a focus on'second-order equality actually threatens to
undermine those values.
Second-order equality can be achieved by one of two means: increasing
the pre-speech resources of the economically inferior speakers or limiting the
economically superior speakers' ability to employ their resources for expressive purposes. Whatever the constitutional implications of the former methodology,314 the latter is in fundamental and inescapable tension with the First
Amendment's premises. Whichever value or values one believes that free
expression fosters, the simple fact is that those values inevitably are undermined by a governmentally imposed reduction in the sum total of available
expression. If one assumes that individuals self-realize on the basis of both
the dissemination and receipt of expression or that the democratic process is
facilitated by making individual citizens more informed about the issues facing society, at least as a prima facie matter a reduction in the sum total of
expression undermines the achievement of those goals.
A hypothetical construct illustrates this tension: Imagine a society in
which the government, motivated by concern about economic inequality
among potential speakers, has brought about speaker equality simply by
prohibiting expression of any kind. It would be impossible to deny that, in
such a situation, the concerns of second-order equality have been fully satisfied because, after all, as a result of the government's action, no speaker has a
resource advantage over any other. Yet it would be preposterous, of course,
312

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).

313

See Redish & Lippman, supra note 26, at 282 (classifying viewpoint regulation as "in-

herently boundless").
314 A governmentally provided right of access conceivably could give rise to problems of
compelled speech. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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to suggest that such a scenario actually fosters free expression values: no one
is saying or hearing anything. Although this construct is wholly hypothetical,
it does underscore the key conceptual point that reliance on second-order
equality as a rationale for restricting the use of economic resources for expression is in general tension with free expression values. Second-order
equality effectively invites-indeed, absent realistic avenues for increasing
the resources of the economically disadvantaged, logically dictates-a reduction of expression to the lowest common economic denominator. Instead of
remaining in large part ignorant only of the views of those who lack economic resources, then, the public-because of governmental action-will remain "equally" ignorant of the views of those who do possess substantial
economic resources. It is difficult to imagine that free expression interests
could thrive in such a setting.
Even if a negative, second-order equality of silence were accepted as
legitimate, however, it is unclear how it logically could be confined to the
goal of remedying inequalities of economic resources. Numerous inequalities
other than economic ones exist among competing speakers. Certain speakers
are better known to the public than are others for reasons having nothing to
do with their expression's subject, content, or persuasiveness (for example,
former athletes, actors, or astronauts). 315 If negative equality among speaker
resources is the goal, why should the government not seek to counterbalance
such extraneous built-in advantages? Indeed, given the potential existence of
numerous other inequalities among speakers, it is quite conceivable that the
use of superior economic resources actually could be employed to equalize
other similarly unrelated but nevertheless effective inequalities. To allow the
government to silence only the more economically powerful speakers, then,
is inconsistent with the purposes and values of the free expression system.
It is true, of course, that corporations possess a number of statutorily
granted economic advantages that may enable corporations to have a competitive edge over other speakers. Thus, advocates of second-order equality
might respond that restrictions on corporate expression are merely intended
to counterbalance the undue corporate advantages that the state already artificially created. But it is important to recall that these advantages presumably were given in a wholly nonspeech context; they were not specifically
created to provide corporations with an expressive advantage. Similarly, inheritance laws ensure that heirs of large estates will retain most of the estate's corpus, 316 capital gains laws economically benefit successful investors,
and patent laws give investors artificially created monopolies, thereby effectively providing all three groups with potential economic advantages in the
expressive marketplace if they choose to exercise them. Moreover, the gov315 Perhaps one could argue that a speaker's prior success and public notoriety-no matter
how unrelated to her expression's subject-conceivably might provide a listener with a distinct
rational basis for giving that speaker's expression greater weight. Even if one were to accept
such reasoning, one could fashion a similar argument about wealth's advantages: the very fact
that the speaker has had the ingenuity to access or retain such financial resources arguably may
provide greater legitimacy to the speech, at least in certain recipients' minds.
316 See generally §§ 26 U.S.C. 2001, 2010 (1994) (establishing rules for taxes and tax credits
on estates).
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ernment has enacted statutes to provide not-for-profit corporations with significant benefits under the tax laws, 317 arguably resulting in parallel
incidental expressive advantages. No one, to our knowledge, has seriously
suggested that the expressive activity of these individuals or organizations
can constitutionally be curbed as a result of their potential economic
advantages.
To be sure, to the extent that the government has created any of these
economic advantages solely for the purpose and effect of granting to certain
groups or individuals an expressive advantage, it is conceivable that legitimate First Amendment equality problems would arise. If the government
provides these advantages on a general basis, however, to revoke them exclusively in the limited context of expressive rights would undoubtedly run afoul
of the wise and318well-accepted doctrine that government may not selectively
inhibit speech.
This is not to suggest that the First Amendment somehow prevents the
government from adjusting or revising the existing economic order, or from
redistributing economic wealth. If, because of social policy or normative economic theory choices, the government decides to redistribute private economic wealth or to create new economic entitlement programs, it may do so
without contravening free speech rights, even though the consequence of this
action could well be effectively to reduce the power of the previously economically superior groups or individuals to express themselves. In such a
case, the impact on expressive activity is wholly incidental to a broader, nonspeech related purpose. 319 But whether such economic reforms are either
morally or practically appropriate has long been a subject of great moral and
political controversy-a subject that the First Amendment itself guarantees
may be debated freely and openly. To employ concerns over second-order
equality as a rationale for excluding corporate speech from the First Amendment's scope, then, would be to superimpose one side of this substantive economic debate on the very processes designed to air and resolve that debate.
Despite these obvious and severe difficulties inherent in the concept of
second-order equality as a rationale for excluding corporate speech from the
First Amendment's scope, both commentators and the Court have relied on
this rationale-either explicitly or implicitly-as a basis for doing just that.
The Austin Court, for example, seemed to adopt implicitly the second-order
equality principle-while denying it was doing so-in the name of stopping
corruption in the political arena. The Court defined the term as "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accuno
mulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or '32
0
ideas.
political
corporation's
the
for
support
public's
the
to
correlation
Judge Wright similarly viewed such corporate spending as "corruption" be317 See id § 501 (exempting certain corporations from taxation).
318 See supra notes 275-279 and accompanying text.
319 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); see also supra notes 299-301 and
accompanying text.
320 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990); see FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986) (arguing that resources make a corporation formidable "even though the power of the corporation may be no reflection of the power of
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cause "the political arena is less healthy, and less likely to serve the public
interest and democratic ideals, if the agenda and the discussion are dominated by those with ample financial resources." 321 The central assumption

underlying such reasoning is that more of certain speech or speech 3from
par22
ticular speakers harms, distorts, and corrupts the political process.
One should note that the concept, ff accepted, obviously is not logically
limited to profitmaking corporations' speech but must also apply to the
speech of individuals or associations whose wealth enables them to finance
their message at a greater rate than would less affluent individuals. Yet the

Court rejected equality as applied to individuals as a rationale for a limitation
on expressive expenditures in Buckley v. Valeo 32 3 and has shown no inclination to shift from that position.
The equality rationale effectively views corporations as surrogates for
the broader concern about the dangers of economic power in general.324 The
fear is that the use of dominant economic power in the expressive marketplace will have the same effect that it usually has in the commercial marketplace. Under this theory, corporations are viewed, not unreasonably, as the
rough equivalent of the feared concentration of economic power. This argument errs, however, in relying on economic power as the ultimate surrogate
for political power, persuasiveness, and effectiveness. It certainly is true that
money contributes to a message's intensity in the sense of the depth and
breadth of dissemination. 325 Experience demonstrates, however, that money
its ideas"). For a discussion of the invalidity of reducing speech to be proportionate with its
popular support, see supra notes 210-220 and accompanying text.
321 Wright, supra note 162, at 631; see also Austin, 494 U.S. at 660-61 ("Corporate wealth
can unfairly influence elections... and present[s] the potential for distorting the political process."); MCFL, 479 U.S. at 257 ("Th[e] concern over the corrosive influence of concentrated
corporate wealth reflects the conviction that it is important to protect the integrity of the marketplace of political ideas."); SUNSTEIN, supra note 220, at 239 (arguing that equality of speech is
a legitimate goal, but the state should not be selective by limiting corporations without limiting
the speech of others); id. at 235 (arguing that restricting corporate speech alone cannot achieve
political equality).
322 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 220, at 20-21 (arguing for a theory of the First Amendment
based on the ideal of "deliberative democracy," including a commitment to equality and diversity of views); Wright, supra note 162, at 636 ("[T]he truth-producing capacity of the marketplace of ideas is not enhanced if some are allowed to monopolize the marketplace by wielding
excessive financial resources.").
323 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam).
324 See SUNsTEIN, supra note 220, at 238 (suggesting it is improper to restrict only the
speech of wealthy corporations but not of wealthy individuals).
325 See Powe, supra note 221, at 275 (noting the privilege of wealth in purchasing more of a
consumption item-media advertisements); Carl E. Schneider, Free Speech and CorporateFreedom: A Comment on First National Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 1227, 1280
(1986) (arguing that the power to purchase access to the media is "not a fair test of either an
argument's truth or its innate popular appeal" (citation omitted)); Shelledy, supra note 6, at 575
("[W]ealth gives some advocates exposure to more voters .... "); J. Skelly Wright, Politics and
the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1019 (1976) (arguing that money is
merely the idea's intensity, not the idea itself); id. at 1019 n.70 ("[J]ust as the volume of sound
may be limited by law, so the volume of dollars may be limited, without violating the First
Amendment.").
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alone does not resolve the effectiveness question; there may be other reasons
3 26
why a message is effective or a certain political result is reached.
Judge Wright completely ignored this fact in his analysis. He argued
instead that "massive spending and sophisticated media campaigns ... have
3' 27
swamped referenda that were initially favored by a majority of the voters.
He described several referenda campaigns in which initial polls had shown
one side leading, but the electoral result, usually following spending by corporate interests, had been the opposite.3 28 From these examples, he inferred
that the corporate spending functioned to "distort[ ] the expressed will of the
people by the sheer inequality of financial resources and the avalanche of
campaign messages. 3 29 Judge Wright apparently assumed that the early poll
results, not the electoral outcome, represented the electorate's true wishes
and that the difference between the two was caused by the influx of corporate campaign messages that "used the big lie, the half truth, and the sly
innuendo, amplified and repeated over and over again, to pervert the minds
of the people. '330 This analysis cavalierly assumes-without reference to the
slightest empirical support-that the existence of economic power necessarily
implies the use of improper or deceptive substantive messages. Yet there is
no reason to believe that economic power is either necessary or sufficient to
create such problems.
Wright further assumed-again, without a drop of empirical supportthat it was not the message's merits that convinced listeners to vote a certain
way, but its sheer repetition that defeated "the very purpose of direct democracy."'' 31 The idea that "the expressed will of the people" is something other
than the voluntarily chosen product of a popular voter referendum, however,
seems inconsistent with democracy's premises and operation. 332 Advocacy,
even by entities that have amassed great wealth, will be effective "only to the
extent that it brings to the people's attention ideas which-despite the invariably self-interested and probably uncongenial source-strike them as
true. '333 Although Judge Wright argued that the Bellotti decision "placed the
[F]irst [A]mendment squarely in opposition to the democratic ideal of political equality[,]"

334

in reality it is reliance on the second-order equality princi-

ple that creates such opposition by enabling the government to deny the
326 See Bezanson, supranote 13, at 778 ("[D]ominant economic power has at best an uncertain relationship to persuasion of the electorate through advertisements ....

); Shelledy, supra

note 6, at 574 ("[I]t is not so readily apparent how a corporation's advocacy could exert an
influence on elections that exceeds public support for its ideas."); see also Austin, 494 U.S. at 684
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that corporate advocacy will be accepted only to the degree that
the message strikes voters as true).
327 Wright, supra note 162, at 623.

328 See idL at 623-24.
329 Id. at 624-25.
330 Id. at

625.

331 See id.

332 See Shelledy, supra note 6, at 574; supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text.
333 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 684 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissent-

ing) (emphasis omitted); see also Shelledy, supra note 6, at 574 ("[Wle must generally assume
that speech affects voting behavior only when it persuades .....
334

Wright, supra note 162, at 632.
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voters the information and opinion that will inform their self-governing
actions.
Judge Wright purported to expand upon Professor Karst's theory that
the First Amendment's "central meaning" is the equal liberty of expression.3 35 Professor Karst's concern about equality, however, primarily revolved around limitations on governmental power to prohibit some speakers

or some points of view and not others336-what we have described as first-

order equality.3 37 When Professor Karst wrote that "all speakers and all

points of view are entitled to a hearing,"3 38 he was not arguing that the First
Amendment requires the government to act in order to make a speaker
heard. Rather, he argued only that the First Amendment prohibits the gov-

ernment from preventing any of these speakers from being heard based on

339
the content of a speaker's message.

2. The Misperception of the Limited Pie: The "Drowning Out" Concern
"The risk posed to freedom of speech," Professor Fiss has argued, "occurs whenever speech takes place under conditions of scarcity, that is, when-

ever the opportunity for communication is limited. In such situations one
utterance will necessarily displace another." 34 0 He believes that "in politics,

scarcity is the rule rather than the exception," because "[t]he opportunities
for speech tend to be limited, either by the time or space available for communicating or by our capacity to digest or process information." 34 1 He concludes that "[i]n a referendum or election ...

there is every reason to be

concerned with the advertising campaign mounted by the rich or powerful,
because the resources at their disposal enable them to fill all the available
space for public discourse with their message. '34 2 Other commentators have
expressed similar views. It has been asserted, for example, that "because of
the wealth and power of corporations, 'their views may drown out other
points of view.' "343
335 Karst, supra note 311, at 21-23. This theory, based on the Court's decision in Police
Departmentv. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94 (1972), in which the Court struck down a law permitting
all picketing except labor picketing outside a school, provides a strong theoretical justification
for the First Amendment's content distinction. See RDI SH, supra note 86, at 110.
336 See Karst, supra note 311, at 29; Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96 (stating that the First Amendment requires "an equality of status in the field of ideas" and that all viewpoints be heard
equally (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
337 See supra notes 311-313 and accompanying text.
338 Karst, supra note 311, at 28.
339 See id. at 35.
340 Fiss, supra note 14, at 15.
341 Id. at 15-16.
342 Id. at 16.
343 DAN-COHEN, supra note 14, at 109 (citation omitted); see Dan-Cohen, supra note 149,
at 1245-46 (criticizing the Bellotti Court for rejecting this argument); Shelledy, supra note 6, at
576 ("[C]oncentrated wealth may enable corporations to reduce the likelihood that individual
voices will be heard ....); Wright, supra note 162, at 625 ("Regardless of their message, [corporations] simply drown out their opponents when they have the wherewithal to outspend them by
margins of up to fifty to one."); id. at 637 ("Unchecked political expenditures ... may drown
opposing beliefs .... ).

1998]

What's Good for General Motors

To the extent that guaranteeing economically powerful corporations'
First Amendment rights would displace others' expression, the constitutional
analysis this Article adopts in the prior section 3 4 might require revision. No
one, however, has made a persuasive argument-on either intuitive or empirical grounds-that such is actually the case. 34 5 Indeed, the Bellotti Court rejected the drowning out assumption, precisely because there had been "no
showing that the relative voice of corporations has been overwhelming or
even significant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts, or that there has
'34 6
been any threat to the confidence of the citizenry in government.
We doubt that, as a practical matter, one could ever make such a showing. Perhaps drowning out can occur only if there exists some definite, "limited pie" of speech, such as a situation in which one corporation buys up all
the time and space in every mass media and speech outlet, thus preventing
other speakers from ever reaching an audience or at least from reaching it to
the extent that their desires and resources permit. Contrary to Professor
Fiss's wholly unsupported assumption, 34 7 however, it is by no means clear, as
an empirical matter, that any such situation has occurred or, if it has, whether
the situation has arisen with any meaningful frequency level.
A milder version of the drowning out argument suggests that some media reach larger audiences and tend to be more expensive. Therefore, wealth
enables the corporation to access those media that less affluent advocates are
unable to reach. Accordingly, the wealthy have access to more voters and
more opportunities to persuade.3 48 Alternatively, one scholar has argued,
corporate speakers who consume a large amount of space and time will drive
the price of all media beyond the means of less affluent advocates.3 49 The
former argument, one should note, is not really a "drown-out" scenario but
rather merely a restatement of the competitive edge that economic superiority concededly creates. The latter argument, even if true, simply reflects the
free market's operation. Assuming that any of these scenarios were true,
however, there certainly would seem to exist less restrictive means to avoid
expressive drown-out than the heavy-handed elimination of the corporate
voice in its entirety. These might include, for instance, setting price ceilings
35 0
on media access, requiring media to provide access, or public financing.
Beyond these unlikely scenarios of actual silencing, the drowning out
argument amounts to nothing more than a paternalistic and unverified as344 See supra notes 311-339 and accompanying text.
345 See Powe, supra note 221, at 280 (noting the absence of proof that counterspeech to
economically powerful interests' expression will not be forthcoming).
346 First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789-90 (1978); see also Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 706 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[E]ven were we to
assume that some record support.., would make a constitutional difference... [t]he majority
provides only conjecture."); Shelledy, supra note 6, at 576-77 (requiring record evidence or legislative findings that corporate speech was dominating and therefore impoverishing public debate,

and arguing that such evidence was lacking in both Bellotti and Austin).
347 See Fiss, supra note 14, at 15 (asserting that "in politics, scarcity is the rule").
348 See Shelledy, supra note 6, at 575.
349 See id.
350 These proposals, of course, raise their own First Amendment issues, which are beyond
this Article's scope.
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sumption that at some unknown and unknowable point, so much expression
has been disseminated that the consuming public has reached a desensitization point of "information overload." An example is Professor Shelledy's
description of a hypothetical message placed in a newspaper:
Many people who receive those papers do not read them cover to
cover .... When people receive more information than they can
process, they process what they can and ignore the rest ....

[A]

competing advocate increases the likelihood that my views will be
among the material readers will ignore .... [It is] also a competition
for attention, in which material resources can provide a dispositive
351
advantage.
As an empirical matter, the reception model that Professor Shelledy
posits may or may not be accurate. A message's frequency and volume and
the money a speaker places behind that message certainly are elementsalthough not necessarily determinative ones-of influence. 352 It is an indisputable reality, however, that not everyone views the same medium at the
same time. We do not know how, when, or where each person hears or
processes particular information or why a particular message succeeds or
fails. A person who has not driven by a billboard that takes a particular
position may well see a political advertisement that takes the same position
on television or in the newspaper. Therefore, it is impossible, and thus dangerous, to assume that at some point, enough expression will have been disseminated to produce an informed public.
Equally lacking in empirical or intuitive support is the belief-assuming
there actually does exist some point of public desensitization-that it is the
views of those with less economic power that will fail to gain the public's
35 3
attention. Except in the relatively unlikely scenario of total displacement,
less powerful interests would still have at least some degree of access to the
public. Consequently, there is no a priori reason to believe that their
messages are any less likely to reach the public before the public reaches the
point of overload than are the messages of the economically more powerful
interests. Indeed, it is at least conceivable that by continually pounding the
same message ad nauseum, the economically powerful interests actually will
alienate the public-what could be described as the "Macarena" effect.
In short, one cannot construe the First Amendment to allow the government conclusively to determine either how citizens process information or
when the fear of an information overload dictates a need for governmental
intervention. Society can never be sure that such a point ever exists, much
less that citizens have, in fact, reached it. The commitment to the free speech
concept clearly implies that too much information-if, indeed, there could
ever be such a thing-always is preferable to too little. Moreover, it seems
351 Shelledy, supra note 6, at 575-76; see also Fiss, supra note 228, at 1412 (noting that
opportunities for speech are limited "by our capacity to digest or process information"); Schneider, supranote 325, at 1283 (noting that the Bellotti statute restricted only media advertisements,

which present no information at all).
352 See supra notes 315-315 and accompanying text.
353 See supra notes 340-347 and accompanying text.
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likely that the act of sifting through a range of information, selectively receiving some and ignoring the rest, is part of the exercise and development of
human faculties. This exercise and development is an essential part of the
35 4
self-realization process, an essential part of free expression's purpose.
D. The Exclusion of CorporateSpeech as Viewpoint Regulation: The
Ideological Rationale
If economically powerful corporate interests were likely to be on both
sides of a political debate, there probably would exist little basis for the
drowning out concern; in such a scenario, no side of the debate necessarily
would suffer in a relative sense from corporate speech protection. The assumption inherently underlying the second-order equality concern in general
and the drowning out concern in particular, then, must be that corporate
speech likely will support only one side of a political debate.
This conclusion quite probably will be accurate in the majority of cases.
Not surprisingly, economically powerful corporate interests tend to favor
such positions as less effective and pervasive governmental regulation, tort
reform, and lassiez faire capitalism.355 This, of course, will not always be the
case. But it is probably accurate often enough to treat corporate speech as
the rough equivalent of something approaching more politically conservative
free market advocacy. If such is the case, however, then attempts to exclude
corporate speech from the First Amendment's scope are similarly likely to
represent the rough equivalent of burdening only one substantive politicaleconomic position. There is thus reason to believe that, ultimately, the objection to corporate speech generally amounts to little more than an indirect
form of viewpoint discrimination. The benefits of banning corporate speech
inhere entirely to those persons or groups who hold viewpoints that oppose
or disagree with the particular corporate position because they no longer
have to hear it, respond to it, or fear its persuasive impact.3 56 A ban on corporate speech, therefore, does not equalize the debate but rather tilts the
debate entirely in the other direction: the most effective contribution to one
side of the public debate is effectively silenced.
The viewpoint discrimination that appears to infect the debate over corporate speech is indicative of a larger scholarly debate over the issue of the
First Amendment's "ideological drift. '357 Despite the general notion that
fundamental First Amendment principles demand "neutrality for all political
354 See supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text; see also REDISH, supra note 86, at 21-22
(arguing that free speech fosters self-realization by promoting the development of one's

"uniquely human faculties" and by facilitating one's ability to make life-affecting decisions);
Wright, supra note 325, at 1020 ("The play of ideas, the sifting of good ideas from bad, of truth
from falsehood, of justice from injustice-all these are essential parts of our system as well.").

355 See Schauer, supra note 227, at 938 (providing an example of alcohol and tobacco industries opposing "encroaching restrictions or outright prohibitions on advertising their products");

Shiffrin, supra note 204, at 689-90 (discussing the conservative position taken by corporations).
356 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1986) (plurality
opinion).
357 J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DuKE LJ. 375, 383.
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speech," 358 some free speech theorists are alarmed that the First Amendment, formerly "sauce for the liberal goose[,] increasingly has become sauce
'35 9
for the more conservative gander.
The paradigmatic example of the First Amendment's supposed conservative discovery is what Professor Shiffrin calls use of the First Amendment as "a banner for corporations seeking to dominate election
campaigns. '360 It is not surprising that such First Amendment use would
cause concern among scholars sympathetic to the political left. Several commentators have actually argued overtly that a reason to restrict corporate
speech is that most corporations, benefiting as they do from laissez faire economic policies, will present the politically and economically right-wing point
of view.361 The express goal, according to one scholar, is to "bring corporate
power to heel.

'362

Scholars on occasion have suggested more subtle attempts to rationalize
corporate speech's exclusion from the First Amendment. Professor Shiffrin,
for example, has advocated a free speech model that places the dissenting
voice at the center of First Amendment concern, with a political tilt against
the powerful.3 63 On the basis of this analysis, Shiffrin concludes that corporations "have less of a claim to be at the heart of the First Amendment. ''364 In
order to accept this argument, however, one initially would need to define
the "dissenting voice" concept. Surely economic power alone could not serve
as the measuring rod, because-as the experience of the tobacco companies
quite clearly illustrates-financial power does not always translate into widespread political popularity.3 65 Even if one were to accept Shiffrin's dissenting
358 See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 701 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); see Redish, supra note 164, at 1449-50 (describing a "supposedly politically neutral
free speech theory").
359 Balkin, supra note 357, at 384; see Schauer, supra note 227, at 942 (discussing the "noticeable rightward movement in the political center of gravity of free speech argumentation").
360 Shiffrin, supra note 204, at 689.
361 See Schauer, supra note 227, at 955 (noting the "affinity between economic libertarians,
most of whom vote Republican, and the principle of free speech"); Shiffrin, supra note 204, at
712 (noting that it is "relevant that the [corporate] owners of the press are largely conservative"
and that it is natural for their speech "to reflect their general view"); Mark 'ishnet, Corporations and Free Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 253, 259 (David Kairys ed., 1982) (noting that
"nominally independent expenditures are made with a heavy tilt toward the right wing"); see
also Fiss, supra note 14, at 10-11 (assuming that allowing unlimited speech of economically powerful interests will "impoverish rather than enrich public debate"); LINDBLOM, supra note 4, at
201-21 (expressing concern over the principle of "circularity," i.e., that the very corporate interests that the state is supposed to regulate dominate the political agenda); Wright, supra note 162,
at 636 (assuming that the expression of economically powerful interests will be dominated by
lies, half-truths, and innuendos). Professor Fiss openly advocates the use of viewpoint-based
discrimination to determine the First Amendment's reach when he argues that the "program
advanced by Ralph Nader and other consumer advocates might have a First Amendment basis,
because in fighting 'agency capture' we might be increasing the independence of the state from
the market and thus enhancing its capacity to correct for the constraints that social structure
imposes on public debate." Fiss, supra note 14, at 44.
362 Tushnet, supra note 361, at 260.
363 See Shiffrin, supra note 204, at 719.
364 Id.
365 See 21 C.F.R. § 897.1-.34 (1997) (establishing regulations applicable to the tobacco
industry).
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voice model, then, there is every reason to believe that the views of the economically powerful should be able to trigger the need for First Amendment
protection as easily as can the expression of the economically disadvantaged.
The availability of vast economic resources to disseminate views is of little
assistance when the government has prohibited the dissemination of these
views because the government deems them offensive or unwise.
More fundamentally, there is something both puzzling and perverse in
basing free speech theory on a reverse correlation between the expression's
popularity and the degree of protection the speech is to receive. If a popularly elected and accountable government has banned expression, one would
think that such expression cannot be characterized as either popular or powerful as a definitional matter. If, on the other hand, certain speech is so powerful that it actually controls the political agenda,366 then presumably the
accountable and representative branches of government will never regulate
it, and the First Amendment issue will remain forever a purely hypothetical
one.

It is true, as Judge Wright argued, that the "core notion of the [F]irst
[A]mendment remains the protection of diverse, antagonistic, and unpopular
speech from restriction based on substance. '367 But acceptance of this relatively uncontroversial proposition in no way implies that what is normally
nondiverse, nonantagonistic, or supposedly popular speech does not equally
deserve protection, if and when the need for such protection actually arises.
Otherwise, the principle of First Amendment equality would be rendered a
truly bizarre concept.
Indeed, if one actually took Professor Shiffrin's logic seriously, then the
legislative enactment of restrictions on corporate speech presumably would
reduce the level of First Amendment protection to be given to expression by
corporate interests' opponents, because it is now the opponents' voice that
represents the dominant rather than the dissenting view, purely as a definitional matter.
Although we most assuredly do not purport to speak for Professor Shiffrin, we seriously doubt he would ever intend or accept such a preposterous
result. If our prediction as to Professor Shiffrin's view is accurate, however,
then the theory of greater protection for the dissenting voice is not really
intended to protect all dissenting voices but rather amounts to little more
than an indirect form of viewpoint discrimination. For example, R.J. Reynolds's speech is today surely no less unpopular than that of someone burning
a draft card; yet, Professor Shiffrin's dissent model would protect the latter
but, we presume, not the former. 368 The theory, therefore, cuts at the very
366 See LINDBLOM, supra note 4, at 201-06; supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text.
367 Wright, supra note 162, at 636; see also Tushnet, supra note 361, at 257 (noting that the
First Amendment normally is a vehicle to give power to the powerless).
368 Professor Shiffrin has argued that speakers in cases such as United States v. O'Brien,391
U.S. 367, 369 (1968), in which an individual burned a draft card to protest the war, and FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 729-30 (1978), in which comedian George Carlin made obscenity-laced social commentary, are at the center of constitutional protection. See STEVEN H.
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heart of the First Amendment's true, first-order equality principle.3 69 The
fact that both Judge Wright and Professor Shiffrin would deny protection to
corporate speech while simultaneously claiming to protect unpopular voices
indicates that their approach protects not all unpopular views but only the
unpopular views with which Judge Wright and Professor Shiffrin happen to
agree.
The underlying-if largely unstated-viewpoint-based nature of free
speech models that exclude protection for corporate speech should now be
obvious. In the name of enhancing and broadening public debate and deliberations on policy questions, these models substantially restrict a central
voice as a participant in that debate, quite probably because of substantive
disagreement with the expressed views' merits. 370
Conclusion: "Pay No Attention to the Man Behind the Curtain"
"Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain," the Wizard of Oz
futilely urges Dorothy, once she has discovered-much to her surprise-that
the feared and powerful Wizard is nothing more than a human with a magnified voice and the benefit of special effects. Those who oppose extending full
First Amendment protection to corporate speech similarly ignore the fact
that, ultimately, corporations are entities formed by humans in order to further human interests. As such, from the perspective of free speech theory,
one should view corporations not as mindless, faceless organizations that are
robotically driven by profit-maximization but rather as devices created and
organized to facilitate human self-realization. When properly viewed in this
manner, one should consider corporate speech no differently, for constitutional purposes, from the expression of other associations formed to foster or
attain predetermined political, economic or social goals. 37' Moreover, corporate speech may further the values of free expression by providing that
speech's recipients with valuable information and opinion on issues facing
them, both in their individual lives and as citizens within a collective demo372
cratic society.
To be sure, in an important sense one can view corporations as beneficiaries of special and artificial protections created by the state. But these
369 See supra notes 311-339 and accompanying text.
370 Similar free speech problems inhere in the arguments of civic republican scholars such
as Professor Sunstein, although he never singles out corporate speech for special negative treatment. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 220, at 239. His theory relies on a belief, however, that
"[d]ramatic differences in wealth and power are ... inconsistent with the underlying premises of
a republican polity," Sunstein, supra note 233, at 1552, combined with a general opposition to
individuals acting in their private interests, see id. at 1550. Logically, this would eliminate the
corporate speaker, which is often powerful and usually motivated by economic self-interest. This
theory fails, because of the same problem of viewpoint bias, by suggesting the possibility of an
objective common good that overrides individual self-interest. See Redish & Lippman, supra
note 26, at 295. If we imagine a candidate with strong anti-corporate views, the result under
Professor Sunstein's theory is that those who possess the most powerful incentive to support that
candidate may speak in support, but those who oppose him-including corporations whose business might be harmed, a clear example of private interest-cannot voice their opposition.
371 See supra notes 132-150 and accompanying text.
372 See supra notes 151-179 and accompanying text.
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protections, one reasonably can presume, were developed in contexts wholly
outside the expressive context, and their impact on expression is therefore
wholly incidental. In any event, much the same could be said of private individuals, not-for-profit corporations, and charitable institutions, all of whom
may well have benefited, in one way or another, from the largesse or financial protection of both the federal and state governments' laws. These facts
have never disqualified the expression of these individuals or associations
from the constitutional guarantee's scope. 373 Nor could they, without dealing
a virtually crippling blow to public debate's richness.
There can be little doubt that corporations' economic resources often
will provide them with a potentially significant advantage in the marketplace
of ideas and information. But to exclude corporate speech 'from the First
Amendment's scope in the name of equality would be to seriously misunderstand the equality concept's proper role in free expression theory. Correctly
understood, the equality element in free speech thought dictates that the government must remain neutral among competing ideas in restricting the expression of private individuals and entities; all ideas must be treated
equally. 374 It does not necessarily mean, however, that all speakers must
enter the battle on totally equal terms.
Financial resources are only one of many conceivable advantages a
speaker may bring to public debate, and any attempt to regulate solely the
advantages of money for expressive purposes would give substantial and unequal strategic benefits to those possessing alternative advantages. Due either
to the structural design of society or simply chance, different people will
enter the public debate possessing different resources, talents, and advantages, none of which, experience has shown, guarantees ultimate success in
the political arena. The government's attempt to equalize these relative advantages in public debate would be virtually impossible and, at the same
time, would inevitably give rise to significant harms to free expression's interests. At the very least, equalization by reducing available expression's sum
total could only further impoverish the debate's quality and move us further
away from the goal of an informed public. Despite wholly unsubstantiated
warnings about the dangers of so-called information overload, 75 it is both
dangerous and counterintuitive to proceed on the assumption that reducing
the sum total of available information and opinion actually benefits the
public.
Using what this Article calls second-order equality as a rationale for declining to protect corporate speech, therefore, would seriously endanger the
values that widespread communication fosters, because it would inevitably
result in a governmentally-imposed leveling process, designed to reduce public debate to the lowest common denominator. Consequently, the populace
373

See supra notes 131, 249-259, 316-316 and accompanying text.
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This does not mean, it should be emphasized, that in its own expression the government

must be neutral among competing philosophies and ideas. See Martin H. Redish & Daryl I.
Kessler, GovernmentSubsidies and Free Expression,80 Mnw. L. REv. 543, 565-66 (1996) (noting
the constitutionality of allowing subsidized government employees to speak in favor of govern-

ment policies).
375 See supra notes 351-354 and accompanying text.
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would undoubtedly be deprived of potentially valuable communication, in
376
direct contradiction of the essential premises of a free expression system.
Commentators, on occasion, have expressed the fear that widespread
corporate speech could threaten to drown out competing views due to its
sheer volume. 377 But such a concept incorrectly presupposes a "limited pie"
of expression-a presupposition that, for the most part, simply fails to comport with reality. Generally, the fact that one side of a debate widely disseminates its views in no way-either theoretically or practically-prevents the
other side from speaking. 378 If and when such a situation ever arose-as
when, for example, one side has purchased all available advertising time and
space in the local media-more narrowly drawn methods for dealing with the
situation may be developed. 379 This concern, even in the relatively rare instance in which it actually does arise, surely cannot justify the wholesale exclusion of corporate speech from the First Amendment's scope. Regulations
that are so gratuitously sweeping in their reach clearly would exceed the lim380
its of the First Amendment's overbreadth doctrine.
Quite frankly, it is not all that difficult to comprehend the hostility that
many commentators currently express toward corporate expression. Such
speech is generally likely to advocate an anti-regulatory, free market philosophy that is widely unpopular among many academics today. At worst, then,
one could view a governmental attempt to revoke the financial advantages
possessed by the economically powerful in terms of public debate as an indirect-albeit no less ominous-form of viewpoint control. Viewed from this
perspective, such efforts serve merely as a surrogate for the broader nonspeech goal of reordering the distribution of economic wealth in society.
This is an issue calling for ultimate moral choice and is, therefore, one that
must itself be subject to free and open debate, protected by the First Amendment guarantee.
It is the danger of such reasoning that should make us extremely hesitant
to exclude corporate speech from the First Amendment's scope. To exclude
corporate speech would amount to an indirect but nonetheless dangerous
form of viewpoint regulation, premised on an unsupportable prediction as to
both the likely content and effectiveness of a particular type of speaker's expression. 381 This manipulation of the First Amendment's scope is wholly in376 See REDISH, supra note 86, at 50 (arguing that the individual needs "all possible information" in making life decisions).
377 See supra notes 340-354 and accompanying text.
378 Although several commentators have argued that at some point the sum total of available expression could amount to an information overload on the populace, there exists neither
empirical support for such a notion nor any workable means for determining whether such a
point had ever been reached. See supra notes 345-345 and accompanying text.
379 See supra note 345 and accompanying text. One could say the same for the argument
that corporate speech may interfere with the free speech rights of dissenting shareholders. See
supra notes 288-288 and accompanying text.
380 See generally New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 771 (1982) (holding that a statute may
be invalidated as overbroad when it "reaches a substantial number of impermissible applications"); Monaghan, supra note 207, at 4 (describing the overbreadth doctrine as protecting the
plaintiff's right not to be burdened by an unconstitutional rule of law).
381 See supra notes 324-324, 355-370 and accompanying text.
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consistent with the true equality principle that inheres in a free expression
system: a belief that in choosing to restrict expression, the government is required to treat all ideas equally.

